【作者】 马扬； 陈茁；

【Author】 Ma Yang Chen Zhao(University of Science & Technology of China, Hefei 230026)

【机构】 中国科学技术大学商学院；

【摘要】 文章提出在人力资源的培训过程中由于存在培训成本和受培训人员的流动性而引起企业间培训博弈过程的存在,并将其抽象为完全信息静态博弈模型进行分析,得出:企业倾向于对员工进行特殊培训而将一般培训外部化;大型企业由于培训的外部效应减小更愿意对员工进行培训:行业资本的集中在某种程度上也促进了培训。文章从博弈论的角度证明了Hoffman(1986)的结论,企业培训的实际情况也验证了文章分析的结论。最后,文章给出了相应的一些建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The article pointed out that game process exists between training behavior of employers because of the existence of the training cost and the liquidity of the trained employees. Based on a static complete information game model, the article concluded that: employers tend to supply special training and externalize the general training, huge enterprises trained their employees more because the extemalization of the income of the training is decreased, the monopoly improved the training in some extent. Concordant with the reality, this paper proved the conclusion of Hoffman(1986). Finally, the article presented some advice.更多还原