【作者】 景崇毅； 石丽娜； 孙宏；

【Author】 JING Chong-yi1 SI Li-na2 SUN Hong1 (1.Aviation Transportation Management School, Civil Aviation Flight University of China, Guanghan 618307, China; 2. Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Aviation Transportation School, Shanghai 201620, China)

【机构】 中国民航飞行学院航空运输管理学院； 上海工程技术大学航空运输学院；

【摘要】 本文以博弈论的观点,利用改进过的阻截垄断模型对中国大飞机项目决策过程进行动态模拟,采用逆向归纳法分析该不完全信息动态博弈的均衡解。结果显示波音-空客的优策略是阻断-Cournot亚博弈策略,第一阶段的威胁不可置信,第二阶段的打击策略并不会增加垄断者的收益;中方的优策略是进入-坚持,原因是中方的效用函数中引入了"产业结构"变量,即技术扩散效应下的产业链优化升级,双方的关注点差异是导致博弈结局不同于传统阻截垄断博弈结局的重要原因。文章最后对博弈结论进行了扩展,简要论述了大飞机项目所映射出的我国新时期国家发展战略思想——创新型国家发展战略,并对后续研究进行了一定展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper we use improved"blocking monopoly model"to stimulate the decision-making process of China large aircraft project dynamically in terms of game theory idea,and analyze its equilibrium solution with backward induction.The result shows that the best strategy for Boeing-Airbus is counterwork and then Cournot sub-game,the threat of first stage is unbelievable and the strike strategy of second stage cannot increase monopoly’s earnings;while the best strategy for China is entering-insisting,because"industry structure"variable is introduced into the utility function of China,namely,optimizing and updating industry chains under technology diffusion effects,the concern difference between both sides is the main cause that leads the game result differing from the traditional one. And finally we extend the game conclusion,meanwhile briefly discuss our country development strategy in new era reflected through large aircraft project——innovative country development strategy,and propose some suggestions for subsequent study.更多还原