【作者】 王帮俊；

【Author】 Wang Bangjun (School of Management , China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221008)

【机构】 中国矿业大学管理学院；

【摘要】 在离散型公共物品的供给博弈中,对属于私人信息的参与人支付意愿是在做群体决策时必须要弄清的。在传统的策略下,整个社会的帕累托改进是难以达到的。本文针对此问题,建立Groves-Clarke显示机制,使各参与人会如实地报告其类型,从而达到整个社会的帕累托改进。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the game of supplying dispersed public goodvS, we should know each player’s payoff when we make a community decision. But in the traditional strategy, social pareto can not be achieved. To aimed at this problem, in this paper, we set up the Groves-Clarke revelation mechanism, then each player will report his actual type. Social pareto efficiency will also be improved.更多还原