【作者】 钟伯成； 韩江洪； 杜兆芳； 张杰；

【Author】 ZHONG Bocheng HAN Jianghong DU Zhaofang ZHANG Jie School of Computer & Information, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, 230009 Department of Computer Science & Technology, Hefei University, Hefei, 230022

【机构】 合肥工业大学计算机与信息学院；

【摘要】 在IP网络中,当端系统用户以自我利益为中心响应拥塞信息时,将导致网络拥塞控制协议不稳定,甚至拥塞崩溃。需要设计一种不依赖端系统用户自愿合作的健壮的拥塞控制协议。本文基于博弈论方法,提出一种拥塞控制框架,把网络带宽看成一种稀缺资源,由多个非合作用户博弈竞争共享。给出一种有效的价格机制,驱使不合作用户按网络理想控制点操作。结果表明网络可达到最优的 NASH均衡,从而实现一种高效、低时延和无丢失的网络拥塞控制。更多还原

【Abstract】 The congestion control protocol of the network may be instability, even congestion collapse when end-host users in the IP network response the congestion information with selfish interests. It is necessary to design a congestion control protocol which can’t depend on users’ cooperation. We present a novel framework of congestion control based on game-theoretic approaches. We formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game, in which a group of users with individual interests compete for the finite network bandwidth. We give a pricing mechanism which enforce the selfish users operate to the desirable point. We show that network system can admit an efficient Nash Equilibrium and implement a network congestion control which is efficiency, lower delay and no loss.更多还原