【作者】 冯涛； 马建峰；

【机构】 西安电子科技大学计算机网络与信息安全教育部重点实验室；

【摘要】 <正>1 引言不经意传输协议(Oblivious Transfer Proto- cols,OTP)的可证明安全性可以归约为大整数因子分解假设、Diffie-Hellman假设、增强的陷门置换存在性假设、判定性Diffie-Hellman假设等困难问更多还原

【Abstract】 By using the provable security methods based on simulation, we analysed a definition of security for the Protocol Y-Smooth Projective Hashing Oblivious Transfer (Y-SPH-OT) within the framework of universally com-posable security. Y-SPH-OT Protocols are composable security in the case of semi-honest, static adversaries. But Y-SPH-OT Protocols is not composable security in the case of adaptive adversaries. We discussed failure reasons.更多还原