【作者】 赵惠芳； 王艳； 张璇； 杨昌辉；

【Author】 Zhao Hui-fang Wang Yan Zhang Xuan Yang Chang-hui (School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,P.R.China,230009)

【机构】 合肥工业大学管理学院；

【摘要】 有效的管理报酬契约是解决委托代理问题的关键。目前,对于管理报酬契约的设计主要是基于经理人的业绩基础。本文引入具体业绩指标和风险要素,将经理人报酬同时与业绩和风险相联系,为经理人提供努力增进激励和风险补偿激励。本文将会计信息为基础和股票市场为基础的业绩衡量标准相结合,选取经济增加值 EVA 和市场增加值 MVA 指标,并考虑企业风险,设计了经理人报酬契约的模型,以期为上市公司制定经理人报酬契约提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Effective executive compensation contracts are crucial to solve the agency problem in firms.At present,the design of executive compensation is mainly based on performance.This paper introduces specific performance measures and the risk factor for executive compensation,in order to supply managers with the incentive of both efforts and risk taking.This paper combines two performance measurement criteria,which are based on the accounting information and market information respectively,chooses economic value-added (EVA) and market value-added (MVA),considers firm risk and designs the model of executive compensation contracts,which offers reference for executive compensation in listed companies.更多还原