【作者】 马利军； 梁小影； 卢萌； 王海峰； 李建斌；

【Author】 Li-Jun Ma~(*1,2) Xiao-Ying Liang~2 Meng Lu~2 Hai-Feng Wang~(2,3) Jian-Bin Li~2 1 Department of Management Science,Management School,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen,518060 2 Department of SEEM,The Chinese University of Hong Kong,Shatin,HK 3 Department of Automation,Tsinghua University,Beijing,10084

【机构】 Department of Management Science,Management School,Shenzhen University； Department of SEEM,The Chinese University of Hong Kong； Department of Automation,Tsinghua University；

【摘要】 本文分析具有公平偏好零售商与制造商组成的供应链中,在制造商作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者提供批发价格合同给零售商时,零售商如何确定最优的订货量而制造商如何确定最优的批发价格。我们发现当需求满足均匀分布时存在均衡的最优订货量以及最优批发价格。我们也分析需求分布参数如何影响均衡的最优解。最后,我们通过数值计算研究供应链的绩效如何随公平偏好参数变化。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper we consider a simple two-echelon supply chain made of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer has a preference for distribution fairness except for his share of profit.We study how this additional preference affects the supply chain performance.We model the problem as a manufacturer leading Stackelberg game,while the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the retailer determine the order quantity.We also work out the optimal equilibrium wholesale price.更多还原