【作者】 刘德海； 苏烨； 王维国；

【Author】 LIU Dehai~(1,2),SU Ye~(1,2),WANG Wei-guo~(1,2) (1.Center of Econometric Analysis and Forecasting,Dongbei University of Finance & Economics,Dalian 116025,China; 2.School of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics,Dongbei University of Finance & Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

【机构】 东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心； 东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院；

【摘要】 信息的及时获取分析和舆情的有效引导是突发事件应急管理的核心科学问题之一。沿着建立信息传播演化规律的数理模型研究思路,综合考虑群体性突发事件中不同利益方同时存在着信息过剩、信息匮乏和虚假信息等信息特征,建立信息传播的演化博弈模型。其中,过剩信息是政府舆论引导措施的减函数,匮乏信息是政府信息搜集措施的增函数,虚假信息体现在误估模型的收益参数。结合凤翔"血铅事件"案例,分析了各种信息特征对振荡型群体性突发事件的演化影响。研究表明:过剩信息加大了事态的振荡频率;地方政府信息匮乏时事件发生概率的周期增大;降低地方政府的问责成本,提高弱势群体的收益份额,减少上访成本,将增大事件发生概率。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is one of key scientific problems in emergency management that information rapidly obtaining and analyzing, and public opinion effectively channeling.Along with the research idea of building mathematical model to analyze the information dissemination,the evolutionary game model is built in this paper,considering the multiple information characteristics among the stockholders of mass emergency,which include surplus information,information shortage and false information.Surplus information is the decreasing function of measurements channeled public opinion,information shortage is the increasing function of measurements collected information,and false information is shown as misestimating parameter.According to lead poisoning cases in Fengxiang town,the effect of information characteristics on oscillating mass emergency is analyzed.The result shows that surplus information increases the oscillation frequency of event,information shortage increases the cycle of event.If decreasing the punishing cost of local government and the petitioning cost of vulnerable group,and improving the sharing proportion of vulnerable group,the happening probability of mass emergency will increase.更多还原