【作者】 葛枫； 任保平；

【Author】 GEFeng;REN Bao-ping;College of Economics,Zhejiang University;School of Economics and Management,Northwest University;School ofEconomics and Management,Northwest University;

【机构】 浙江大学经济学院； 西北大学经济管理学院；

【摘要】 家族企业作为一种活跃而富有效率的企业组织形式,但为何中国的家族企业逃脱不了"富不过三代"的千年规律?这一规律背后隐藏着的是大多数家族企业必然会面临的"家族主义困境",而在"困境"中,家族权威应发挥其特殊的功效。我们首先通过委托代理模型推导得到最优家族权威水平,并证明了家族权威水平存在既能削减代理成本,又能提升企业绩效的"适当范围"。为实证假设,我们利用2005-2011年的浙江上市家族企业面板数据,在将家族权威具化为族长权威、家族成员拥有权威和管理权威三个变量的基础上,运用普通最小二乘法(OLS)和工具变量(IV)法分别将其对家族企业的代理成本和企业绩效进行分析。实证结果表明,代理成本和企业绩效均关于家族权威呈倒U型分布,但由于驻点的不同,家族权威的"适当范围"也确实存在。更多还原

【Abstract】 Family-owned firm,as a very efficient and active form of enterprise-organizing,still faces the long-lasted problem of what Chinese called "wealth lasts no more than three generations".This problem is commonly seen as a major obstacle for almost every family-owned firm,which is also named "Familism Dilemma".In this situation,the family authority holds a very crucial part.In this thesis,we will perform a deep analysis on the agency cost and firm performance,and find out whether family authority can,at a certain extent,decreasethe cost andpromote theperformance.At last we hopeto find away out for thosefamily-owned firm.更多还原