【作者】 陈收； 邹自然； 杨艳； 张红浩；

【Author】 Chen Shou, Zou Ziran, Yang Yah, Zhang Honghao ( Institute of Business and Administration Hunan University, Changsha 410082, China)

【机构】 湖南大学工商管理学院；

【摘要】 在时间偏好领域,越来越多的证据表明,人的时间偏好不一致,最优决策与决策时点有关,当期的最优决策在下期有可能是次优决策.而现有讨论跨期选择问题涉及时间时,几乎毫无例外的选择时间偏好一致的指数折现.本文考虑时间偏好不一致下的委托代理问题.以准双曲折现一βδ偏好作为代理人的跨期时间偏好,分别讨论当成熟型代理人和部分幼稚型代理人的最优合同.以指数型代理人(β=1)为基准,分析三种类型代理人最优合同的不同以及委托人从中获得利润的高低.研究发现与时间一致代理人比较,当委托人只能根据产出结果的好坏来支付代理人工资时,产出结果好时,制定的工资要高,产出结果差时,制定的工资要低.委托人从时间偏好一致的代理人获得的期望利润要比时间偏好不一致的代理人获得利润高.更多还原

【Abstract】 In the domain of time preference, more and more evidences show that people have time-inconsistency preference. The optimal decisions are related to decision points. That is to say that current optimal decisions may become suboptimum in next period. However, when considering intertemporal choice, the existing discussions nearly all choose exponential discounting. In this paper, we consider the principal-agent problem based on time-inconsistency preference, taking quasi-hyperbolic discounting-βδ preference as the agents’ intertemporal time preference. We consider the optimal contracts of sophisticated agent and partially naive agent respectively. With the exponential agents(β 1)as the benchmark, we analyze the differences of optimal contracts about the sophisticated agent and partially naive agent and the profits that principals can obtain from these contracts. Our findings suggest that, comparing with exponential agents, when principals pay accord- ing to the quality of outputs, there will be higher pay for fl’uitful outputs and lower pay for poor outputs. Principals obtain more expected profits from time-consistency preference agents than time-inconsistency preference agents.更多还原