【作者】 李建标； 王光荣； 李晓义； 张立党；

【Author】 Li Jianbiao,Wang Guangrong,Li Xiaoyi,Zhang Lidang (The Research Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai University/Business School of Nankai University,Tianjin 300071)

【机构】 南开大学公司治理研究中心/南开大学商学院；

【摘要】 劳动合同法强化了无固定期限劳动合同管理,用比较制度实验方法研究外生的制度变量与劳资双方当事人行为,可直接观察行为人即时反应。三种设置的劳动力市场,用以检验无固定期限劳动合同不准解雇和可以解雇等不同制度安排对劳资双方的影响。结果表明:(1)企业提供的工资水平高于自利模型预测的工资水平,并且工资水平越高,努力程度越高;(2)在没有无固定期限劳动合同的情况下,企业对于选择短期或者长期合同是无差异的;企业对于短期或者长期合同提供的工资是相同的;(3)存在无固定期限劳动合同的情况下,企业倾向于签订长期合同;企业对长期合同提供的工资高于短期合同;(4)可解雇的无固定期限合同促使工人提供更高的努力水平;(5)企业提供的工资水平随时间变化平稳;工人提供的努力水平随时间变化而降低,解雇威胁促使工人提高努力水平;(6)无固定期限合同对就业效率影响不大,但是降低了成交生产效率;解雇威胁提高了成交生产效率和就业效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 Employment Contracts Law strengthens open-ended employment contract. Studying effects of exogenous institutions on employment contracting parties’behaviors with comparative institutional experiments, contracting parties’response can be directly observed. Three types of labor markets are designed to explore effects of open-ended employment contract and firing threat on contracting parties’behaviors. Experimental results show:(1)Firms are observed to pay more wage than prediction of selfish models, and higher wage, higher efforts; (2)without open-ended employment contract, there is no difference between short-term employment contract and long-term employment contract for firms; (3)with open-ended employment contract,firms prefer to long-term employment contract;(4)incontrasttoopen-ended employment contract without firing, open-ended employment contract with firing can stimulate workers more efforts; (5) wages stably change over time; efforts decrease over time, and firing threat can stimulate workers more efforts; (6) there is few effects of open-ended employment contract on employment, but decreases product efficiency; firing threat can improve product efficiency and employment.更多还原