【作者】 陈玉罡； 李善民；

【Author】 Chen Yu-gang Li Shan-min(Business School,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,510275)

【机构】 中山大学管理学院；

【摘要】 以2000-2008年中国上市公司1180次并购事件为样本,用经济增加值EVA来衡量价值的创造,并运用多元线性回归模型检验了公司治理、并购中价值创造程度以及收购公司的控制权再转移之间的关系。实证研究的结果表明,对于创造价值的收购公司和毁损价值的收购公司,公司治理所造成的影响是不同的。当收购公司的并购创造了价值且其后没有发生控制权再转移时,价值创造的大小与收购公司的治理正相关;而当收购公司的并购毁损了价值且其后发生了控制权再转移时,收购公司的治理越好,其毁损的价值反而越大。将样本划分为国有控股和民营控股两个子样本后,发现国有控股上市公司的盈利能力弱的情况下还去进行并购,在并购中极容易毁损价值,而毁损价值后不得不让渡其控制权从而被收购。对于民营控股的上市公司来说,并购前的公司价值和规模越大,在并购中毁损的价值也越大,其控制权也更可能被夺取。总体来看,控制权市场具有一定的纠错能力,能使得那些进行了毁损价值的并购行为的收购公司通过控制权转移的方式纠正其收购错误。但是,这种纠错能力并不强。更多还原

【Abstract】 This positive study applied economic added value to measure the value creation and used multivariable regression model to test the relation of corporate governance,value creation in M&A and acquirer’s control rights re-transfer based on 1180 M&A events in Chinese listed companies during the period 2000-2008.The results showed that the corporate governance has different effects between the bidders with value creation and those with value destroy.If the bidders created value in M&A and their control rights have not be re-transferred,the value created in M&A are positive relative to the corporate governance.But if the bidders destroyed the value in M&A and their control rights have been re-transferred,the better the bidders’ corporate governance is,the more the value destroyed is.After dividing the samples into state-owned companies and private-owned companies,the results shows that if the state-owned listed companies with weak profitability have acquired other companies,they would destroy the value and their control rights would be re-transferred.For the private-owned listed companies,those with more value and larger size would be more destroyed in M&A and their control rights would be probably re-transferred.All in all,corporate control market has some function of checking error.It could transfer the control rights of bad bidders to punish their value destroyed behavior in M&A.But the function has not been very strong.更多还原