【作者】 黄健柏； 兰勇；

【Author】 HUANG Jian-bai;LAN Yong;School of Business,Central South University;

【机构】 中南大学商学院；

【摘要】 基于中国铝业公司纵向并购的环境和行为特征,本文构建"上游寡头竞争、下游完全竞争"的两阶段博弈模型,对纵向一体化的排斥效应进行了分析。结论认为,中铝并购电解铝企业对其他独立下游企业具有明显的排斥效应,但这种排斥效应随中铝在上游部门垄断程度的降低而变弱,而纵向并购在一定程度上缓解了变弱程度。中铝纵向一体化的长远目标是尽可能控制铝土矿稀缺资源,并层层利用上游垄断的纵向排斥效应,最终在技术含量高的铝深加工环节上形成垄断优势。模型对"氧化铝——电解铝"价格的市场传导机制失灵等问题也进行了解释。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the environment and characteristic of vertical merger in CHINALCO, this paper set up a two-stage model with an upstream monopoly and a downstream competition, and analyses the market foreclosure of vertical integration. The model suggests the forward integration of CHINALCO make obvious foreclosure, but the foreclosure become smaller with the reduction of upstream monopoly, and the vertical merger alleviates the diminishing degree. The long-range goal of vertical integration in CHINALCO is to controls the bauxite mining as far as possible, and forms the monopoly advantage on fabrication processes and products using the foreclosure of upstream monopoly one by one. The model also explains the failure of market-conduction mechanism about "alumina to electrolytic aluminium" in price.更多还原