【作者】 马永强； 张泽南；

【机构】 西南财经大学会计学院；

【摘要】 本文以政府2009年出台的限薪令为政策背景,依据产权分级管理模式重点考察限薪令对国有企业上市公司高管超额薪酬、薪酬业绩敏感性、薪酬粘性的冲击效应;立足真实活动盈余管理,并有效结合应计制盈余管理,进一步探讨作用于薪酬机制的行政干预是否抑制了高管的盈余管理行为高管因薪酬驱动对不同种盈余管理方式又将如何抉择结果显示:限薪令实施后,高管超额薪酬、薪酬粘性在一定程度有所下降,薪酬业绩敏感性并未显著上升。限薪令的震慑效力通过薪酬机制予以释放,约束了高管的真实活动盈余管理与应计制盈余管理行为,凸显了政府薪酬监管的阶段性效果。限薪后,高管因薪酬驱动实施应计制盈余管理的行为依然存在,证实薪酬动机是诱发高管实施盈余管理的重要因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper investigates the effect of Government Pay Restrained Policy(GPRP) which issued in 2009 on compensation system among Chinese State-owned companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market. We divide our sample into central government companies and local government companies according to its explicit properties. Our research mainly explores that the influence of the GPRP would make some big changes to the top management excess compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivities and compensation stickiness. From the Real Earnings Management(REM) perspective and also combined with Accrual-based Earnings Management(AEM), the paper further discusses and tests the signal effect of GPRP would affect managers’ earnings behavior through their compensation control regulation, that is, whether the joint efforts of compensation incentive and political action of GPRP could restrain the management from manipulating earnings. After the rule issued, what would top management prefer to choose from these two ways of earnings management. The results show that top management excessive pay and pay stickiness decrease at some extent in diversified State ownership companies, however, the sensitivity between the pay and firm performance doesn’t make much difference. The dual effects of the action of GPRP and compensation contracts constrain management holding back the behavior of manipulating both REM and AEM. In the post-GPRP period, the compensation incentive stops management from conducting REM, but still highly induces them to take the AEM, which concludes that compensation incentive is a big driving force for manipulating earnings, especially conducting AEM.更多还原