【作者】 裘益政； 刘彦；

【Author】 Qiu Yizheng,Liu Yan (Financial and Accounting School,Zhejiang Gongshang University,310018)

【机构】 浙江工商大学财务与会计学院；

【摘要】 本文以2007-2011年中国沪、深两市A股民营上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了政治关系以及金字塔结构对过度投资的影响。研究发现,有政治关系的民营企业更有过度投资的倾向,并且政治关系层级越高,过度投资越严重。同时金字塔结构有可能充当法律保护替代机制的角色,减少政府干预,从而抑制政治关系所带来的企业过度投资行为。进一步研究发现,在市场化水平较低和政府干预程度较高的地区,政治关系所导致的过度投资问题更严重,金字塔作为法律保护替代机制所发挥的保护作用也更为显著。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article studied pyramid and over-investment issues of A-share private enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2011.The results show that:Political connections would make private enterprises are more likely to do over-investment,and as the level of political connections increases,the degree of the over-investment gets higher.However,Pyramid structure can act as an alternative mechanism of legal protection to reduce government intervention,thereby inhibiting the over-investment behavior which brought about by the political connection.Furthermore,in the region with lower level of the market or higher degree of government intervention,the problem of over-investment caused by political connection is more serious,and the protective effect of pyramid as alternative mechanisms for legal protection is more significant.更多还原