【作者】 刘亭立； 杨松令；

【机构】 北京工业大学经济与管理学院；

【摘要】 本文以公司盈余质量为经济后果的表征变量,研究了后股权分置的制度背景下,不同控制权公司中独立董事的监管效应。研究发现,独立董事的监管效应具有典型的状态依存特征,并非是单向地发挥作用。相比较而言,国有两职分离公司中,独立董事的监管效应较好,这一监管效应是通过独立董事在委员会中的任职实现的。对于非国有控制公司而言,独立董事与管理层进行合谋操纵盈余的可能性更高。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper takes the earnings quality as Characterization of economic consequence and study the independent director’s monitoring effect for listed company with different controlling rights.The paper found out that independent directors’ monitoring effect have state dependence character instead of playing one-way role.Comparatively,there is better monitoring effect of independent directors in state-owned company with separating CEO and Director.The better monitoring effect comes from the independent director hold a post in the committees.For non-state-controlled companies,there is more possibility for independent director and managers make earnings collusion.The paper draw a conclusion that it is necessary to analyses the possible state dependence for the research work of independent directors,evaluation of independent directors and policy decision,only in this way,the working environment and the effects of monitoring of independent directors will be better.更多还原