【作者】 刘星； 代彬； 郝颖；

【Author】 Liu Xing Dai Bin Hao Ying (School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,400030)

【机构】 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院；

【摘要】 本文基于委托代理理论,以2004–2008年的国有上市公司为研究样本,对高管控制权与企业资本扩张行为的关系及其对企业财务风险的影响进行了探讨。实证结果发现:高管的权力配置对国有企业的资本扩张行为产生了显著的影响,具体表现在:高管控制权和企业的投资扩张及多元化扩张行为存在显著的正相关关系,而且当企业拥有充裕的现金流时,其正相关程度更大。基于联立方程模型的研究结果表明,控制权较强的高管所实施的多元化扩张战略会加大企业陷入财务困境的可能性。本文的研究结果有助于我们理解国有企业高管控制权的经济后果,并为当前有关国企公司治理和绩效评价机制改革的政策导向提供了经验启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyzes the relationship between executives’ control rights and firm’s capital expansion,and further discusses the influence on firm’s financial risk.Based on the data of SOEs from 2004 to 2008,we find that:Executives’ power allocation can significantly increase the capital expansion behavior of SOEs.Specifically,executives’ control rights have a remarkably positive correlation with over-investment and diversification expansion,and the degree of correlation is greater when the firm has sufficient cash flow.Further results based on Simultaneous Equations Model show that diversification expansion strategy implemented by executives holding larger control rights will increase firm’s possibility of falling into financial distress.The results of this study are not only of great significance to understanding the economic consequences of the control rights of SOEs’ executives,but also provide empirical implications for the policy-making on SOEs’ corporate governance and performance evaluation mechanism reform.更多还原