【作者】 赵青华； 黄登仕；

【Author】 QingHua Zhao1,2 Dengshi Huang1(1.School of Economics & Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031;2.School of Accounting,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067)

【机构】 西南交通大学经济管理学院； 重庆工商大学会计学院；

【摘要】 高管股票期权激励是近几年来我国资本市场颇受争议的话题。本文以2006—2009年实施ESO激励的33家公司为样本,对资本市场对ESO激励首次公告的反应进行了理论探讨、描述性分析和事件研究。研究表明,我国上市公司ESO激励的期限和条件明显有别于他国。而ESO激励的首次公告所产生的市场效应为负,但没有显著性意义。但在公告前两周有显著的异常收益,说明公告前市场上已经得到了泄漏的公司"内部信息",ESO已经作为炒作的"题材"融入了相关的信息之中。而在公告之后的两周都没有显著的异常收益,说明公告已经是迟到的信息,ESO激励计划所引起的效应已经平复。更多还原

【Abstract】 Executive stock option(ESO) plan is controversial topic in Chinese capital market in recent years.We look at ESO plan issued by China companies between 2006 and 2009.In addition to a descriptive analysis of 33 launched plans,I perform an event study covering 33 announcements of ESO plan adoptions during this period.Our findings shows that the ESO plans of our listed companies are different from other country in the terms and conditions obviously and the market effect produced by the first announcement of ESO plan is insignificant negative,but there are significant positive stock market reactions before the two weeks of announcement in the press.Namely,market has received inside information leaked by companies prior to the announcement.No abnormal returns in the two weeks after the announcement indicate that the announcement of ESO plan is already late and the effect caused by the ESO incentive plan has calmed down.更多还原