【作者】 刘浩； 孙铮；

【Author】 LIU Hao SUN Zheng (Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,200433)

【机构】 上海财经大学会计与财务研究院；

【摘要】 在美国等发达股票市场中,会计盈余信息的主要功能是定价,但是在政府管制严格的中国股票市场中,会计盈余信息的首要功能是"选拔"。本文对中国证监会和上市公司之间的博弈构建了数学模型,提出了"会计盈余信息选拔的不可能定理":如果以下两个条件存在——(1)监管部门设定选拔标准有一个上限,或(2)上市公司通过合法或非法方式虚报盈余的"虚报成本系数"较小,那么单纯依靠会计盈余信息将无法选拔出理想的目标公司。由此得到的可能的理论深化是:度量标准应当与契约形式相配合,如果制度环境本身限制了会计盈余信息作为度量标准的使用,那么改善的要点不应该集中于会计盈余信息本身,而应该在于博弈制度安排的调整。本文同时也为新会计准则执行的研究提供了新的理论视角。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the developed stock markets such as American market,the major function of accounting information is to do price. But the first function of accounting information is to do selection in the Chinese stock market within strict regulation. In this paper,we made a game theory model between the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) and listed companies,the CSRC choosing candidates by ROE during SEO. We got the impossible theorem of the selection by accounting information of earnings:if (1) there was a roof of the selection standard set by the CSRC; (2) the cost of deceiving was too low,the selection by ROE wouldn’t work. We had theoretic deepening:the measurement should be suitable for the form of contracts. If the institutional environment restricted the function of accounting information,the focus should not be on the accounting information,but on the adjustment of institutional arrangement. The paper provided a new view for research on the enforcement of new accounting standards.更多还原