【作者】 吕长江； 赵宇恒；

【Author】 Changjiang Lu & Yuheng Zhao Management School of Fudan University;Business School of Jilin University

【机构】 复旦大学管理学院； 吉林大学商学院；

【摘要】 本文基于管理者激励货币性补偿和非货币性补偿的比较,对国有企业管理者激励补偿结构与公司绩效的关系进行了研究。通过实证分析,我们发现,国有企业年薪的激励效应是逐渐发生作用的,而持股则作用甚微;非货币性补偿起到了明显的激励作用,尤其是行政级别对企业绩效产生了重要影响。中央级企业赋予高管的非货币性补偿起到了真正的激励作用;省部级企业赋予高管的非货币性补偿则起到了虚假的激励作用,这种非货币性补偿促使省部级企业的高管不必努力为企业增加实质性收益,也可以提高企业绩效;相比之下,地方级企业赋予高管的非货币性补偿最低,但却也发挥了积极作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the comparative analysis of monetary and non-monetary compensation,this paper studies the relationship between SOE top manager compensation incentive structures.We argue that the incentive effect of SOE manager monetary compensation is gradually come true,and the incentive effect of SOE manager holding share is little,how ever,the incentive effect of SOE manager non-monetary compensation is significant,especially,the administration ranking exert significant impact on firm performance.There exists significant incentive effect for the manager of central government owned enterprises;incentive effect is very limited for the manager of province owned enterprises;how ever,incentive effect is active for the manager of local firm.更多还原