【作者】 黄亮雄； 徐现祥；

【Author】 Huang Liangxiong,Xu Xianxiang (Lingnan College,SUN YAT-SEN University)

【机构】 中山大学岭南学院；

【摘要】 改革之初,时代推崇党政创业者,如今,提倡建设服务型政府,对官员又有了新的要求。本文建立简练的博弈模型,来探究地方官员的类型选择问题。分析表明,当市场容量较小时,社会只会出现创业型官员,当市场容量足够大时,稳定型官员是市场的唯一选择。中央政府可以通过改变官员考核机制,越偏向于消费者福利,来使得稳定型的官员就越早出现,从而有利于建设服务型政府。更多还原

【Abstract】 At the beginning of the reform,the era respected entrepreneur.And now,we need new requirement to the officials,while promoting to construct service-oriented government.In this paper,we build a concise game model to explore the problem of the selection of local officials’ type.Analysis showed that only entrepreneurial officials will occur,when the market size is small.Stability official is the only option for the market,when the market size is large enough.Central Government officials can change the assessment system,to make stability officials appear sooner by biasing consumer welfare more,which is good for building service-oriented government.更多还原