【作者】 周方召； 周正； 曲振涛；

【Author】 Zhou Fang-zhao Zhou Zheng Qu Zhen-tao (School of Economics, Zhejiang University; Center of Economics Research, Harbin University of Commerce)

【机构】 浙江大学经济学院； 哈尔滨商业大学经济研究中心；

【摘要】 股权结构和法律保护分别是内、外部公司治理的重要机制,本文从最终控股股东的角度,运用经验研究的方法,以2003~2007年中国民营上市公司为样本,通过非平衡面板数据的回归分析发现,控股股东的现金流权与公司财务绩效正相关,即体现了激励效应;控股股东的两权分离程度和不对称股权结构对公司绩效有负向的影响,体现了侵占效应。此外,在超额控制权较大,并且控股股东参与管理的上市公司中,现金流权的激励效应更低。而有意思的是,通过引入法律保护水平变量后我们发现,在不同分离程度的公司中,投资者法律保护水平对于激励效应的影响存在着差异,在超额控制权较大的样本中,法律保护水平能够显著增强控股股东的激励效应;但在超额控制权较小、现金流权较高的样本中,法律保护对于激励效应没有显著影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Ownership structure and law protection are important internal and external mechanism of corporate governance. From the view of ultimate controlling shareholder, this paper uses empirical research method , does regression analysis by the method of unbalanced panel data using the data of private listed companies from 2003 to 2007 in Chinese. We find that, there is a positive correlation between the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders and corporate performance which reflects incentive effect ,and a negative influence on corporate performance brought by the degree of the divergence between the ultimate control right and cash flow right and by disproportional ownership structure which reflects expropriation effect. In addition, in the listed companies with excessive control rights and controlling shareholders participating management, the incentive effect of cash flow right is lower. When introduced a variable of the law protection level, we find in the companies with different divergence degree, law protection has different impacts on the incentive effect. In the sample companies with more excessive control right, law protection significantly enhances the controlling shareholders’ incentive effect, while in the sample companies with less excessive control right and high cash flow right, law protection has no remarkable influence on the incentive effect.更多还原