【作者】 陈树桢； 熊中楷； 文海鸿； 曾静；

【Author】 Shuzhen Chen,Jian Luo,Haihong Wen 1 College of Economy and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing,400030,China. 2 Fiancial Department of Chongqing Institute of Technology, Chongqing,400050,China. 3 Social Science of Department,Logistic Engineering College, the PLA.Chongqing.400016,china.

【机构】 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院； 重庆工学院财务处； 解放军后勤工程学院社科部；

【摘要】 针对电子商务环境下双渠道供应链终端的价格竞争,传统零售商以增值服务投入增强自己的竞争优势。本文研究、比较分析了增值服务投入下Stackelberg和Bertrand两种非合作博弈。研究发现:在增值服务投入下,零售渠道的价格总是高于网上直销渠道的价格;在Stackelberg博弈中,若制造商能调整批发价格并使之小于其临界值,就能实现双渠道供应链中制造商与零售商共赢。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper,mostly aims at pricing game of the dual-channel model of supply chain terminal.In order to mitigate channel conflict,we add added-value service to the retail channel of supply chain and study price competion between the direct channel and retail channel with added-value service under Stackelberg and Bertrand game.On the basis of these games analysis,we find:with the added-value service investmenting,the price of the retail channel is always higher than the direct channel under some conditions.If the wholesale price can be adjusted to less than its critical value,the two channels can be coordinated and the manufacturer can realize win-win with the retailer under Stackelberg game.更多还原