【作者】 王宇生； 余玉苗；

【Author】 Yusheng Wang Yumaio Yu Economics and Management School of Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei,China 430072

【机构】 武汉大学经济与管理学院会计系；

【摘要】 本文利用我国上市公司2004～2009年的数据,从企业长期借款债权人监督的新视角,实证研究了公司的长期借款对会计师事务所审计收费产生的影响。研究发现,长期借款规模与审计收费负相关,在资产负债率相同的企业中,长期借款占总负债比重越大,审计收费越低。此外,本文还对长期借款对自由现金流量的控制作用进行了研究,揭示出长期借款对自由现金流量的控制作用并没有因为"预算软约束"的存在而消失,在自由现金流量水平高的企业,审计收费不仅会因为长期借款债权人的监督作用而降低,而且也会因为长期借款对自由现金流量的控制作用而降低。本文的研究结论表明:长期借款债权人的监督机制能降低公司的财务风险和经营风险,具有一定的治理效率,虽然在我国普遍存在预算软约束的现象,但是长期借款对自由现金流量的控制作用仍然能在一定程度上缓解上市公司的委托代理问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Using a sample of listed companies in China,we examine the relation between a company’s long-term loans and auditing from the perspective of creditor supervision.We find that the size of long-term loan is negatively correlated with audit fees.For the enterprise that have the same asset-liability ratio,the greater the proportion of long-term debt to total debt is.the lower will be audit fees.In addition,the paper also examines the impact of long-term loans on the free cash flow.The result reveals that the existence of the "soft budget constraint" does not make the control effect of long-term loans disappear.For companies with high levels of free cash flow,audit fees decease not only because of the supervisory role of the long-term lenders,but also because of the control action of the long-term debt to free cash flow.This study shows that long-term supervision mechanism can reduce a company’s financial risk and operational risk.Despite the prevalence of soft budget constraint phenomenon in China,the long-term loans still can alleviate the agency problem of listed companies.更多还原