【作者】 贾春晓； 刘润然； 汪秉宏；

【Author】 ChunXiao Jia1,RunRan Liu1,BingHong Wang1,2 1University of Science and Technology of china,Hefei 230026,China 2Research Center for Complex System Science,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science,Shanghai 200093,China

【机构】 中国科学技术大学； 上海理工大学复杂系统科学研究中心上海系统科学研究院；

【摘要】 现实生活中,奖励机制普遍存在,有多公司和团体以奖励全部或部分员工以此鼓励所有人合作,但奖励真的能起到人们预想的结果吗?是不是奖励额度越大,合作者就越多?或者奖励的人越多,合作者就越多呢?本文就此问题对BA网络上的囚徒困境博弈进行研究,结果表明:在奖励人数一定的情况下,增加奖励力度,合作者开始有一定的增加,但当达到一定值后,合作者几乎不再随着奖励的增加而变化;另一方面,在奖励额度有限的情况下,存在一个最优的奖励人数使得合作频率最高。更多还原

【Abstract】 In real life,many companies and organizations adopt reward to encourage employees to work hard.But how does the reward influence the frequency of cooperation? Is it more reward or more rewarded people more cooperators? Maybe not! In this paper,we have studied the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma with reward.The simulation results show that,for a fixed number of rewarded people,the frequency of cooperation increases monotonously until it reach a certain level as the reward increasing.In addition,there is an optimal number of rewarded people for a certain reward.更多还原