【作者】 肖兴志； 陈长石；

【Author】 Xiao Xingzhi and Chen Changshi (Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance & Economic)

【机构】 东北财经大学；

【摘要】 本文依据中国煤矿安全规制过程中出现的规制波动现象,将经济激励环境引入模型分析以诠释中国安全规制和煤矿生产之间的微妙关系。通过分析,我们得到以下三点结论:首先,停产整顿会造成死亡人数的增加;其次,解释了当前煤炭产量与死亡率之间为何呈现负相关;最后,产权改革无法从根本上解决煤矿安全问题。本文指出,煤矿安全规制波动是中国煤矿安全问题难以解决的直接原因,而围绕煤炭这一巨大利益体所形成的利益联盟和激励体制是造成中国煤矿安全问题难以解决的深层原因。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper rests on the unique phenomenon of fluctuations in China’s coal mine safety regulations;explaining relationship between safety regulation and coal mine production by incorporating economic stimulations into mathematical model.Through analysis,we get three points of conclusion:First,shutdown policy will increase mortality,second,explaining the inverse correlation between the coal output and the mortality rate,third,coal mine property reform can not solve coal security problem primarily.This paper points out that the coal mine safety regulation fluctuation is the immediate reason for china’s coal mine safety problem,and the stimulation system surrounding the coal and enormous benefit union creates in-depth reason.更多还原