【作者】 刘晓峰； 曹华；

【Author】 XIAOFENG LIU HUA CAO (Nankai University)

【机构】 南开大学经济学院金融系；

【摘要】 本文与传统的委托-代理框架不同,在一般均衡框架下研究上市公司管理层报酬与公司股价、市场均衡之间的关系。发现在一个存在做空机制的市场中,即使不考虑上市公司的委托-代理问题,如果不给予上市公司管理层某种形式的额外补偿,市场将极端缺乏效率。在某些极端参数条件下,市场甚至不存在均衡。我们的研究表明:抛开道德方面的考虑,类似美国AIG公司高管这样"肥描"的存在,在某种意义上是市场经济条件下难以避免的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Compensation to the corporate management is traditionally approached in the context of the principal-agent theory.In contrast,this paper looks into the relationship among management compensation,the stock price and market equilibrium under the general equilibrium framework.It is found that in a market where short-selling is allowed extreme in- efficiency would result if the management of a listed company did not receive extra compensation in one way or another even without taking into account the principal-agent issue.Under certain extreme parameters,there would be no market equilibrium.更多还原