【作者】 王学斌； 寇宗来；

【Author】 XUEBIN WANG (Shanghai University ) ZONGLAI KOU (Fudan University )

【机构】 上海大学国际工商与管理学院； 复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心；

【摘要】 央行为了激励各商业银行增设ATM而批准开征跨行费,我们的研究表明,跨行费制却打击了各商业银行增设ATM的激励。本文以Salop环形城市模型分析了跨行取款不收费制、跨行费制、额外费制下银行在ATM业务上的成本收益情况,本文有意义的结论主要有:当交换费等于ATM的边际成本时,两种费制都会使银行达到利润最大化;在纯粹ATM业务上,跨行费是战略替代的,额外费是战略互补的;在银行竞争上,跨行费是战略互补的,额外费是战略替代的。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to encourage commercial banks to use more ATMs,PBOC allows them to charge foreign fees.We show that foreign fees reduce commercial banks’ incentive to use more ATMs.We construct a Salop model to analyze three conditions:no-fee,foreign fee,and surcharge.Our meaningful conclusions mainly are:When the interchange fee is equal to ATM’s marginal cost,the bank’s profit could be maximized;for pure ATM businesses, foreign fee is strategy-substitutable and surcharge is strategy-complementary;for banking competition,foreign fee is strategy-complementary and surcharge is strategy-substitutable.更多还原