【作者】 张翼； 李辰；

【Author】 YI ZHANG CHEN LI (Peking University )

【机构】 北京大学光华管理学院；

【摘要】 对于内部现金流影响企业投资行为的原因,存在两种不同的解释,即对应过度投资的自由现金流假说和对应投资不足的信息不对称理论。本文对1998—2001年上市公司的投资—现金流敏感性进行实证分析。我们发现,在地方政府或一般国企控制的公司,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加,投资对现金流的敏感性下降,支持了过度投资与自由现金流假说;而在中央部委、境内非国有实体和自然人最终控制的公司,没有发现过度投资与自由现金流问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 For the reason why internal cash flow can influence investment there exist two alternative explanations,i.e.,Free-Cash-Flow Hypothesis associated with overinvestment and Asymmetric-Information Theory indicating underinvestment.Based on data of listed companies’ we find that in the companies controlled by local governments or state-owned enterprises’ the investment -cash flow sensitivity decreases as the largest shareholder s holding increases;while in the companies controlled by central government’ non-state-owned entities or natural persons’ the sensitivity does not decline as the largest shareholder s holding increases.Our results suggest that there exist free-cash-flow problems in the companies controlled by local governments or stateowned enterprises.更多还原