【作者】 毛捷； 金雪军； 袁佳；

【Author】 JIE MAO XUEJUN JIN JIA YUAN (Zhejiang University)

【机构】 浙江大学经济学院； 浙江大学竺可桢学院；

【摘要】 本文借助惯例演化博弈模型来分析证券市场新旧投资理念的更替过程。本文的主要结论如下。选择现有投资理念的个体所占比重以及选择新投资理念的相对效用决定了现有投资理念实现ESS均衡的难度;现有投资理念的ESS均衡不是随机稳定均衡(SSE),而新投资理念的ESS均衡是惟一的SSE;在特定投资者空间分布和信息交换模式下,选择新投资理念的成员规模和协同效应的限定程度决定了新投资理念能否扩散。更多还原

【Abstract】 The transition between new and existing investment strategies is studied with evolutionary game theoretical models.Proportion of investors choosing the existing strategy and the relative utility of choosing the new strategy play a crucial role in deciding the difficulty for the existing strategy to reach ESS equilibrium;ESS equilibrium of the existing strategy is not SSE.but that of the new strategy is;under certain patterns for investors space distribution and information exchange,the size of investors choosing the new strategy and the extent to which the coordination effect is localized determine whether the new strategy diffuses or not.更多还原