节点文献
乡村旅游开发背景下土地征收的利益相关者冲突与调适
Stakeholder Conflict and Adjustment of Land Expropriation in the Context of Rural Tourism Development
【作者】 陈炜;
【导师】 何朝银;
【作者基本信息】 福州大学 , 社会学, 2023, 硕士
【副题名】基于P市若干乡村的调查
【摘要】 随着城镇化进程的加快以及乡村旅游的不断开发,土地作为一种稀缺性资源,必将受到各利益相关者的追逐。乡村旅游产业开发对土地的需要必然导致地方政府对土地征收的推动,而土地征收各利益相关者之间的冲突致使土地征收现实冲突呈加剧的态势。本文利用P市乡村相关数据以及实地访谈材料,从利益相关者理论视角出发,探究征地冲突背后的深层原因以及冲突调适的因素,主要研究结论如下:(1)征地冲突的产生实质上是各利益相关者之间的多重冲突,主要可以分为地方政府与被征地村民的冲突、村民与村集体经济组织的冲突、地方政府与村集体经济组织之间的冲突。(2)村集体经济组织作为集体土地所有权的拥有者,在当前的村庄自治体系下面临着两大问题,第一是残缺的产权体系等综合性因素影响下,村集体经济组织的收入不足以维持组织运转;第二是村级组织职能边界不清,出现了“一套人马,三块牌子”的现状,主导组织不明的情况下村集体做出的决定无法代表村民的真正意愿。因此,村集体在与地方政府的博弈上追求利益最大化,在与村民的博弈中出现角色不清甚至越位的情况,侵害村民的土地利益。(3)地方政府承担着公众利益代言人的法理身份与土地财政的“经济人”身份,一方面是公共利益概念的界定不明导致地方政府征地范围的泛化,另一方面是财政压力下地方政府在土地出让的巨大增值面前的经济诱惑。于是,在制度不完善以及现实财政因素面前,地方政府趋利的征地行为就发生了,而非公益性的征地行为往往会导致征地与村集体甚至村民发生冲突。(4)征地项目中边缘化的村民的话语权以及公共利益分别被村集体以及地方政府代理,面对非自愿性的征地,村民内部也呈现出分化的趋势,出现沉默与反抗两种行为选择。沉默的村民部分是因为生产生活已经与土地脱节,只希望土地能“卖个好价钱”,另一部分则是基于风险回避的生存伦理,在政府权威以及村集体对村庄公共权力的垄断下选择妥协;而反抗的村民则会采取“依法反抗”以及“以法反抗”的行动方式。针对上述征地过程中各利益相关者的行动总结,本研究提出征地冲突成因的三层解释框架,认为除了将冲突成因归结到利益争夺以及制度不完善上,也应该关注非正式规则下的行动对征地冲突的影响。在征地冲突中,地方政府将征地项目以“行政发包制”的形式承包给村干部,乡贤作为村民利益保护人、征地事务监督人、公共服务提供人全程参与征地实践,同时中央也从顶层设计的角度出发改革不合理的征地相关制度,在这些因素的综合作用下,征地冲突在一定程度上被调适。
【Abstract】 With the acceleration of urbanization and the continuous development of rural tourism,land,as a scarce resource,is bound to be pursued by various stakeholders.The need of land for rural tourism industry development inevitably leads to the promotion of land expropriation by local governments,and the conflicts among stakeholders of land expropriation lead to the aggravation of real conflicts of land expropriation.Based on relevant rural data and field interview materials in P City,this paper explores the deep reasons behind land acquisition conflicts and conflict adjustment factors from the perspective of stakeholder theory.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)Land expropriation conflicts are essentially multiple conflicts among stakeholders,which can be divided into conflicts between local government and villagers whose land is expropriated,between villagers and village collective economic organizations,and between local government and village collective economic organizations.(2)As the owners of collective land ownership,village collective economic organizations are faced with two major problems under the current village autonomy system.The first is that the income of village collective economic organizations is not enough to maintain the operation of the organization under the influence of comprehensive factors such as the incomplete property rights system.Second,the boundary of village organizational functions is not clear,and there is a situation of"one set of people,three brands".When the leading organization is unclear,the collective decisions made by the village cannot represent the real will of the villagers.Therefore,village collectives pursue the maximization of interests in the game with local governments,and play an unclear role or even offside in the game with villagers,infringing on the land interests of villagers.(3)Local governments assume the legal identity of public interest spokesperson and the identity of"economic man"of land finance.On the one hand,the unclear definition of the concept of public interest leads to the generalization of the scope of land expropriation by local governments;on the other hand,it is the economic temptation of local governments in the face of the huge value added of land transfer under the financial pressure.Therefore,in the face of the imperfect system and realistic financial factors,the land expropriation of local governments to seek profits occurs,while the non-public land expropriation often leads to conflicts between land expropriation and village collectives or even villagers.(4)In the land acquisition project,the voice and public interest of the marginalized villagers are respectively acted by the village collective and the local government.In the face of the involuntary land acquisition,the villagers also show the trend of differentiation,and there are two behavioral choices:silence and resistance.Some of the silent villagers only hope that the land can be"sold at a good price"because the production and life have been disconnected from the land.The other part is based on the survival ethics of risk avoidance and choose to compromise under the government authority and the monopoly of the village collective over the village public power.The villagers who resist will take the actions of"resisting according to law"and"resisting under the law".In view of the above summary of the actions of stakeholders in the process of land acquisition,this study proposes a three-layer explanatory framework for the causes of land acquisition conflicts,and believes that in addition to the causes of conflicts attributed to interest competition and institutional imperfection,we should also pay attention to the impact of actions under informal rules on land acquisition conflicts.In land expropriation conflicts,local governments contract land expropriation projects to village cadres in the form of"administrative contract system",and villagers’talents participate in land expropriation practice as villagers’interests protectors,supervisors of land expropriation affairs and public service providers.Meanwhile,the central government also reforms unreasonable land expropriation related systems from the perspective of top-level design.Land acquisition conflicts have been adjusted to some extent.
【Key words】 rural tourism; Conflicts over land acquisition; Conflict adjustment; Stakeholders;
- 【网络出版投稿人】 福州大学 【网络出版年期】2026年 01期
- 【分类号】F321.1;C912.82;D630