【作者】 李雪梅；

【导师】 倪得兵；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 应用经济学， 2024， 硕士

【摘要】 产品更新策略是企业长期战略的关键组成部分。在产品更新的过程中,企业需要关注消费者的偏好,以生产出更符合市场需求的产品。然而,消费者的偏好通常是其私有信息,企业往往难以获得。随着信息技术的发展,企业可以通过收集消费者的历史购买行为数据来获取消费者的偏好信息。那么,这些历史购买数据在何种意义下含有偏好信息呢?针对这一问题,本文构建了垄断企业与消费者关于产品更新的完全信息情形下的动态博弈模型和不完全信息情形下的信号博弈模型。进一步,本文采用子博弈精炼均衡概念求解了完全信息动态博弈模型,采用精炼贝叶斯均衡概念求解了信号博弈模型。针对信号博弈模型中的多均衡特征,用“直观标准”(通过剔除相对均衡战略中的劣战略)选出了唯一的分离均衡。基于此分离均衡,分析了先验信念对均衡结果的影响,并比较了完全信息与不完全信息情形下的均衡策略与均衡收益,获得了相应的结果。这些结果有助于回答“企业如何有效利用消费者历史购买行为制定产品更新策略”这一核心问题。更具体地,本文获得的主要结论如下:(1)在消费者购买旧产品阶段(第二阶段),当支持企业改进产品质量的临界后验信念充分高,且先验信念相对于该临界后验充分低时,存在混同均衡;当两种类型消费者偏好差异充分大时,存在分离均衡;(2)在消费者购买旧产品阶段(第二阶段),满足“直观标准”的唯一分离均衡是两种类型消费者都选择其帕累托最优的购买量,此时消费者的历史购买量揭示了其偏好信息;(3)在满足“直观标准”的分离均衡下,对于质量敏感程度低的消费者,企业不更新产品质量,对于质量敏感程度高的消费者,企业会将产品质量更新至最大水平;(4)在满足“直观标准”的分离均衡下,当先验信念较小时,企业在第一阶段制定低价,并向两种类型消费者销售。当先验信念较大时,企业在第一阶段制定高价,只向高类型消费者销售;(5)与完全信息情形相比,不完全信息下高类型消费者的效用更高,低类型消费者的效用更低,企业从高类型消费者上获得的总利润更高,从低类型消费者上获得的总利润更低。更多还原

【Abstract】 Product update strategy is a crucial component of a company’s long-term strategic decisions.During the process of product update,companies need to pay attention to consumer preferences in order to produce products that meet market demands.However,consumer preferences are often considered private information,which is difficult for companies to obtain them.With the development of information technology,enterprises can collect data on consumers’ historical purchasing behaviors to obtain information on consumer preferences.Thus,in what sense do these historical purchasing data contain preference information?To address this question,this thesis constructs a dynamic game model under complete information and a signaling game model under incomplete information between a monopolistic firm and consumers regarding product updates.Furthermore,the thesis uses the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium to solve the complete information dynamic game model and the concept of refined Bayesian equilibrium to solve the signaling game model.In response to the multi-equilibrium characteristics of the signaling game model,the unique separating equilibrium is selected using the “intuitive criterion”(by eliminating dominated strategies in relative equilibrium strategies).Based on this separating equilibrium,the thesis analyzes the impact of prior beliefs on equilibrium outcomes and compares the equilibrium strategies and payoffs under complete and incomplete information,obtaining corresponding results.These results help to answer the core question of “how can companies effectively use consumer historical purchasing behavior to formulate product update strategies.”More specifically,the main conclusions of this thesis are as follows:(1)In the stage of purchasing old products(stage two),when the critical posterior belief in supporting the firm’s quality improvement is sufficiently high and the prior belief is sufficiently low compared to the critical posterior,there exists a pooling equilibrium;when the preference difference between the two types of consumers is sufficiently large,there exists a separating equilibrium;(2)In the stage of purchasing old products(stage two),the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the “intuitive criterion” is when both types of consumers choose their Pareto-optimal purchase quantities,at which point the consumer’s historical purchase quantity reveals their preference information;(3)Under the separating equilibrium that satisfies the “intuitive criterion”,for consumers less sensitive to quality,the firm does not update the product quality,while for consumers highly sensitive to quality,the firm will update the product quality to the maximum level;(4)Under the separating equilibrium that satisfies the “intuitive criterion”,when the prior belief is small,the firm sets a low price in the first stage and sells to both types of consumers.When the prior belief is large,the firm sets a high price in the first stage and only sells to high-type consumers;(5)Compared to the complete information scenario,under incomplete information,the utility of high-type consumers is higher,the utility of low-type consumers is lower,and the firm obtains higher total profits from high-type consumers,and lower total profits from low-type consumers.更多还原