【作者】 陈鹏；

【导师】 王良； 孙犇； 孙程；

【作者基本信息】 西安理工大学 ， 金融（专业学位）， 2024， 硕士

【摘要】 随着企业管理与资本市场的不断发展,企业组织架构从简单的单链式发展成为金字塔股权机构,复杂的股权关系使得终极控制人可以通过多种手段获得超额控制权,其中,股东大会超额控制权是已有的终极控制人超额控制权研究的主要角度,近年来也有学者发现终极控制人通过超额委派董事在董事会也能够获得超控制权。越发复杂的企业组织架构面监管理与经营方面的挑战,股权激励在此背景下应运而生,近年来国内对于股权激励的运用也越发专业与常见,与此同时“创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享”的发展理念自提出后始终指导着国内经济发展的方向,加之“碳达峰与碳中和“概念的提出对国内企业发展提出了节能减排的社会责任要求,自此ESG概念逐渐在国内企业管理中兴起。基于上述现实背景,本文首先对超额控制权、高管股权激励、企业 ESG绩效等研究进行了文献梳理,结合委托代理、公司治理等理论进行了理论分析并提出了关于超额控制权、股权激励及企业ESG绩效的假设。随后,本文通过国泰安(CSM凡\)等数据库收集到国内上市公司2010~2021年共计5183条数据,经数据处理后进行回归分析验证提出的假设,并且经过变囊替换法与缩短年份方法进行了稳健性检验,同时运用工具变撮法进行了内生性分析。研究发现:(1)股东大会超额控制权与高管股权激励存在正相关关系;(2)董事会超额控制权与高管股权激励存在负相关关系;(3)股东大会超额控制权与高管股权激励的关系并不显著;(4)董事会超额控制权与高管股权激励存在显著正相关关系;(5)高管股权激励在股东大会超额控制权与企业ESG绩效之间中存在部分中介作用(6)高管股权激励在董事会超额控制权与企业ESG绩效之间也存在部分中介作用。此外文章进行了超额控制权与企业ESG绩效的进一步分析,发现存在内部代理成本与外部信息传递的中介作用机制。为进一步验证超额控制权的这种中介作用在不同的企业是否具有普适性,本文进从企业终极控制人性质、企业地域性质、企业是否属于高科技企业、企业污染属性四个角度进行了异质性分析。结果显示:(1)国有终极控制人的企业存在“股东大会超额控制权一高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”的中介路径,非国有终极控制人的企业存在“萤事会超额控制—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”之的中介路径;(2)东部企业存在“股东大会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”以及“董事会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”的中介路径,而非东部地区不存在股权激励的中介作用;(3)高科技企业存在“股东大会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”以及“董事会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”的中介路径;非高科技企业不存在股权激励的中介作用。(4)重污染企业只存在“股东大会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”的中介路径;非重污染企业则存在“董事会超额控制权—高管股权激励—企业ESG绩效”的中介路径。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the continuous development of domestic enterprise management and capital market,the enterprise organizational structure has developed from simple single chain to pyramid equity institutions,and the complex equity relationship makes the ultimate controller can obtain the super-control through various means,among which,the super-control of the shareholders’meeting is the main angle of the existing research on the super-control of the ultimate controller,and in recent years some scholars have also found that the ultimate controller can also obtain the super-control through the super-appointment of the directors in the In recent years,some scholars have also found that the ultimate controller can also obtain the over-control power through overappointing directors in the board of directors.More and more complex corporate organizational structure faces management and operational challenges,equity incentives in the context of the em ergence of recent years for the use of equity incentives for the domestic more professional and common,and at the same time,"innovation,coordination,green,open,sharing" development concept has been put forward to guide the direction of the development of the domestic economy,and the "carbon peaks",the "green",the "open",the "shared" development concept has always guided the direction of the domestic economic development,and the "carbon peaks".In addition,the concept of "Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutral" has put forward the social responsibility requirement of energy saving and emission reduction for the development of domestic enterprises,and the concept of ESG has gradually emerged in the management of domestic enterprises since then.Based on the above realistic background,this paper firstly combed through the literature on excess control,executive equity incentives,corporate ESG performance,etc.,combined with the theory of principal-agent,corporate governance and other theories to conduct a theoretical analysis and put forward the hypothesis on excess control,equity incentives and corporate ESG performance.Subsequently,this paper collects a total of 5,183 data from domestic listed companies from 2010 to 2021 through databases such as Cathay Pacific(CSMAR),and after data processing,conducts regression analysis to verify the proposed hypotheses,and conducts a robustness test through the variable substitution method and shortened year method,also conducts an endogeneity analysis with the instrumental variable method.It is found that(1)there is a positive relationship between excess control at the general meeting of shareholders and executive equity incentives;(2)there is a negative relationship between excess control at the board of directors and executive equity incentives;(3)the relationship between excess control at the general meeting of shareholders and executive equity incentives is insignificant;(4)there is a significant positive relationship between excess control at the board of directors and executive equity incentives;and(5)there is a significant positive relationship between excess control at the general meeting of shareholders and executive equity incentives.control and corporate ESG performance;(6)executive equity incentives also partially mediate the relationship between excess board control and corporate ESG performance.In addition,the article analyzes the mechanism of excess control and corporate ESG performance and finds that there is a mediating mechanism of internal agency costs and external information transfer.In order to further verify whether this mediating role of excess control is universal across different enterprises,this paper further analyzes the heterogeneity from four perspectives:the nature of the ultimate controller of the enterprise,the geographical nature of the enterprise,whether the enterprise belongs to high-tech enterprises,and the attributes of the enterprise’s pollution.The results show that:(1)there is a mediation path of "excess shareholder controlexecutive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" in enterprises with state-owned ultimate controllers,and there is a mediation path of "excess board of directors control-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" in enterprises with non-state-owned ultimate controllers.control-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance";(2)Eastern firms have the mediation path of "excess control at the shareholders’ meeting-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" and "board of directors’ excess control-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance".(2)the mediation paths of "excess control in the shareholders’ meeting-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" and "excess control in the board of directors-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" exist in eastern enterprises,rather than the absence of mediation of equity incentives in the east;(3)the mediation path of The mediating paths of "excess shareholder control-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance" and "excess board control-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance".ESG performance" mediation paths;non-high-tech firms do not have the mediating role of equity incentives.(4)Heavily polluting firms only have the mediation path of "excess control in the board of directors-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance";non-heavily polluting firms have the mediation path of "excess control in the board of directors-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance".In non-polluting firms,there is a mediation path of "excess control of the board of directors-executive equity incentives-corporate ESG performance".更多还原