【作者】 张佳；

【导师】 于莹；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 民商法学， 2024， 硕士

【摘要】 为释放制度改革红利,《公司法》(2023修订)明确规定我国股份公司可根据自身发展需要选择适用授权资本制,松动资本形成阶段的国家管制使股份公司设立的资金门槛降低,提高公司内部决策效率的同时还减少了决议成本支出,这种回应商事实践高效率、低成本、强灵活度需求的赋权型公司资本模式迎合了当前我国经济发展的需要,有显著的制度价值。长期以来我国坚持法定资本制,新法修订以前所有的公司法律制度和概念都是围绕法定资本制展开的,引进新制度首先面临的问题就是与法定资本制项下的规则相适应,使法定资本制和授权资本制并存于一个法律体系时能够配合发力、发挥整体效用,不出现因制度层面的矛盾冲突导致商事实践与市场秩序破坏的问题。适用授权资本制意味着赋权董事会行使本来应由股东会行使的新股发行权,使公司决议增发新股事项从重大资本事项变成董事会的经营决策事项,因此需要回答授权资本制体现的股东会和董事会权力划分的公司治理模式问题,也需要回答如何规范董事会行使新股发行权、避免原有股东股权被不当稀释的问题。一方面,由董事会决议新股发行能够解决股份公司股权大众化、股东行权冷漠的问题,可以纠正股东会决议偏差,还能够加速融资进度把握商机,具备授权的正当性;另一方面,股份发行牵扯多个主体,涉及多方法律关系,董事会不当行使决议发行新股这一权力带来的危害比决议普通事项不当带来的危害影响范围更广、影响程度更深,因此规范董事会行权具有必要性。对董事会享有的新股发行权进行合理限制能够促使董事会更好地服务公司发展和实现股东利益,更充分地发挥董事会在公司治理中的中枢作用,从长远来看也能顺应公司治理从股东会主义走向董事会主义的世界公司制度发展潮流。要规范董事会新股发行行为,除了法律事前限制授权资本制适用的公司类型,限制授权的期限、比例、出资形式和规定特定情形下发行权的回归,还需要通过构建不当发行停止请求权、规定股份发行决议瑕疵之诉的措施来对因股份发行不当造成损害的股东予以事后救济,通过司法事后否定性评价的威慑作用促使董事会合法合理行使新股发行权,与法律事前合理授权、限制授权的规定一起形成完整的规范董事会新股发行行为的约束机制。因此虽然本次修法并未明确规定事后救济措施,但从借鉴域外有益立法例、司法实践和实现约束机制的完整性、体系性的角度出发,我国应在将来规定不当发行停止请求权和股份发行决议瑕疵之诉。同时,授权资本制在我国的落地生根不是单兵突进式的,而是需要相关配套制度协助实施的。发挥授权资本制各种优势功能,需要同步落实股份公司注册资本完全实缴制、同步引入无面额股制度,还要完善董事责任承担制度,董事承担信义义务是实现立法者引入授权资本制制度效用的重要基础,因为实现授权资本制便利融资、降低决议成本功能需要重信誉的商业软环境。更多还原

【Abstract】 To unleash the dividends of institutional reform,the Company Law(Revised in2023)of China explicitly stipulates that companies may opt for an authorized capital system according to their development needs.The relaxation of state control during the capital formation stage reduces the financial thresholds for establishing joint-stock companies and enhances internal decision-making efficiency while reducing the costs associated with resolutions.This empowered capital model,responsive to the demands of efficiency,low costs,and high flexibility in business practices,meets the current needs of economic development in China and holds significant institutional value.Traditionally,China has adhered to a statutory capital system,with all legal frameworks and concepts revolving around it before the new law revision.Introducing a new system poses challenges of adaptation to the rules under the statutory capital system.It’s crucial to ensure that both systems,statutory and authorized capital,coexist harmoniously within a legal framework to prevent conflicts and disruptions in business practices and market order.Implementing an authorized capital system involves the delegation of new share issuance rights from the shareholders’ meeting to the board of directors,shifting the resolution of issuing new shares from a significant capital decision to a managerial decision.Thus,it raises questions about the governance model regarding the division of power between the shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors and the regulation of the board’s exercise of new share issuance rights to prevent improper dilution of existing shareholder rights.On one hand,board resolution for new share issuance can address issues such as widespread ownership and shareholder apathy,correct deviations in shareholder resolutions,and expedite financing opportunities,demonstrating the legitimacy of authorization.On the other hand,improper exercise of board resolutions for share issuance has broader and deeper consequences compared to resolutions on ordinary matters,necessitating regulation to ensure proper exercise.Reasonable restrictions on the board’s new share issuance rights can encourage better service to company development and shareholder interests,allowing the board to fulfill its central role in corporate governance.In the long run,this aligns with the global trend of corporate governance transitioning from shareholder primacy to director primacy.To regulate the board’s behavior in new share issuance,apart from pre-legal restrictions on the types of companies eligible for the authorized capital system,limitations on authorization period,proportion,capital contribution forms,and provisions for the return of issuance rights in specific circumstances,measures such as establishing rights to stop improper issuance and lawsuits for flawed share issuance resolutions are needed to provide remedies for shareholders harmed by improper share issuance.Post-judicial negative evaluations can serve as a deterrent for boards to legally and reasonably exercise their new share issuance rights,complementing pre-legal authorization and limitations to form a complete mechanism for regulating board behavior in new share issuance.Although this amendment does not explicitly specify post-remedies,future legislation in China should consider introducing rights to stop improper issuance and lawsuits for flawed share issuance resolutions,drawing from beneficial legislative examples and judicial practices abroad,to ensure the integrity and comprehensiveness of regulatory mechanisms.Furthermore,the implementation of the authorized capital system in China requires complementary institutional assistance.Maximizing the advantages of the authorized capital system entails simultaneously implementing a fully paid-up registered capital system for joint-stock companies,introducing a par value-free share system,and improving director liability systems.Directors’ adherence to fiduciary duties is essential for realizing the utility of the authorized capital system,as facilitating financing and reducing resolution costs rely on a high-reputation business environment.更多还原