【作者】 杨勇；

【导师】 梁学栋；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 物流工程与管理（专业学位）， 2023， 硕士

【摘要】 我国钢铁产业在不断发展的同时暴露的供应链水平低下问题亟待解决。而钢铁供应链中的企业间协同程度低是供应链水平低下的主要原因,这导致钢铁行业供需不匹配,产能过剩。国家频繁颁布对于钢铁行业的去产能政策,力图推进钢铁企业兼并重组,以提高供应链服务水平。钢贸企业是钢铁供应链的重要一环,但由于存在盈利模式传统单一、议价能力弱以及供应链服务意识薄弱等问题面临生存压力。借助数字化手段建造钢铁供应链平台以实现钢铁供应链协同,提升在钢铁供应链中的核心地位是钢贸企业的破局关键。同时,政府作为钢铁行业的监管者,通过补贴及奖惩等监管方式可以促进钢铁行业的资源整合,从而提高钢铁供应链效率。围绕钢铁供应链中相关利益主体,本文构建了钢贸企业与钢铁生产企业的两方博弈模型,并进一步构造考虑政府监管的三方博弈模型。借助两组演化博弈模型研究钢铁行业中各主体的协同策略演化路径,探讨各博弈主体行为决策的影响因素,对于推动钢铁行业实施供应链协同,加强钢铁供应链韧性具有重要的现实意义。本文首先从物流成本视角切入,引入成本分担以及利益共享机制,针对钢贸企业与钢铁生产企业之间的供应链协同策略选择,通过构建两方演化博弈模型分析博弈主体策略行为的演化路径以及系统的演化稳定策略,并对影响稳定策略的相关参数进行分析,通过数值仿真验证结果。结果表明钢贸企业与钢铁生产企业的策略选择受到多重因素的影响,双方博弈主体应该在保证利益的前提下,加大对供应链的资源投入。此外钢贸企业应该积极主动建设钢铁供应链协同平台,加大物流资源的投入,引导钢材生产企业加入钢铁供应链协同平台。然后本文从平台运营视角切入,通过构建钢贸企业、钢材生产企业以及政府的三方演化博弈模型分析三方博弈主体各自策略选择的演化均衡点,重点讨论三方主体组合策略下系统的演化稳定状态,并通过数值模拟的方法验证结论。结果表明三方博弈主体的策略选择受到建设及管理成本、补贴力度以及最大补贴额等因素的影响,还受到钢贸企业采取积极建设平台策略的概率,钢材生产企业采取加入平台策略的概率以及政府采取补贴策略的概率的相互影响,反映了博弈主体策略选择的相互影响和动态演化的影响。在三方博弈主体的组合策略作用下,系统存在五种稳定状态。三方博弈主体选择协同策略的初始意愿越强烈,系统趋于均衡稳定的速率越快。政府部门对钢贸企业和钢铁生产企业的补贴均能促进钢贸企业积极建设平台,从而促进钢铁行业的资源整合。本文构建的两组演化博弈模型对于钢铁供应链协同具有十分重要的理论意义和现实意义,丰富了钢材供应链协同的研究对象,扩展了演化博弈的应用范围,为钢铁行业化解产能过剩难题以及促进钢铁行业供应链协同提供理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 The low level of supply chain exposed by the continuous development of China’s steel industry needs to be solved.The low level of collaboration among enterprises in the steel supply chain is the main reason for the low level of supply chain,which leads to the mismatch between supply and demand and overcapacity in the steel industry.The state frequently promulgates the policy of removing production capacity in the steel industry and tries to promote the merger and reorganization of steel enterprises in order to improve the level of supply chain services.Steel trading enterprises are an important part of the steel supply chain,but they are under pressure to survive due to the traditional single profit model,weak bargaining power and weak awareness of supply chain services.With the help of digital means to build a steel supply chain platform to achieve steel supply chain synergy,to enhance the core position in the steel supply chain is the key to break the steel trade enterprises.At the same time,the government,as the regulator of the steel industry,can promote the integration of resources in the steel industry through subsidies,rewards and punishments and other regulatory methods,thus improving the efficiency of the steel supply chain.This paper constructs a two-sided game model for steel trading enterprises and steel producers,and further constructs a three-sided game model considering government regulation.With the help of the two sets of evolutionary game models,we study the evolutionary path of the synergistic strategy of each subject in the steel industry and explore the influencing factors of the behavioral decisions of each game subject,which is of great practical significance to promote the implementation of supply chain synergy in the steel industry and strengthen the resilience of the steel supply chain.This paper firstly starts from the perspective of logistics cost,introduces cost sharing and benefit sharing mechanism,and analyzes the evolutionary path of the strategic behavior of the game subjects and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system by constructing a two-party evolutionary game model for the strategy choice between steel trading enterprises and steel production enterprises,and analyzes the relevant parameters affecting the stability strategy,and verifies the results through numerical simulation.The results show that the strategy choice of steel trading enterprises and steel production enterprises is influenced by multiple factors,and both game subjects should increase the resource investment in the supply chain under the premise of ensuring the interests.In addition,steel trading enterprises should actively take the initiative to build the steel supply chain collaboration platform,increase the investment in logistics resources and guide steel producers to join the steel supply chain collaboration platform.Then,the paper analyzes the evolutionary equilibrium of the strategy choice of the three game players by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model of steel trading enterprises,steel production enterprises and the government from the perspective of platform operation,focusing on the evolutionary steady state of the system under the combined strategy of the three players,and verifying the conclusions by means of numerical simulation.The results show that the strategy choice of the three game subjects is influenced by the construction and management cost,the subsidy strength and the maximum subsidy amount,and the mutual influence of the probability of steel trading enterprises to actively build the platform,the probability of steel production enterprises to join the platform and the probability of the government to adopt the subsidy strategy,which reflects the mutual influence and dynamic evolution of the strategy choice of the game subjects.Under the combined strategies of the three game subjects,there are five stable states in the system.The stronger the initial willingness of the three game subjects,the faster the system tends to stabilize.And the subsidies from government departments to both steel trading enterprises and steel production enterprises can promote steel trading enterprises to actively build the platform,thus promoting the resource integration of steel industry.The two sets of evolutionary game models constructed in this paper are of great theoretical and practical significance for steel supply chain synergy,enriching the research object of steel supply chain synergy,extending the application scope of evolutionary games,and providing a theoretical basis for solving the problem of overcapacity and promoting supply chain synergy in the steel industry.更多还原