【作者】 杨梅；

【导师】 陈雄兵； 尹昕侠；

【作者基本信息】 中南财经政法大学 ， 金融（专业学位）， 2023， 硕士

【摘要】 股权质押是上市公司股东将其所持有股份作为质押标的物向银行等金融机构获取贷款,到期归还本金并解除质押的一种融资方式。自2013年中国证监会开放场内质押业务以来,我国股权质押市场便迎来了新的发展机遇,股权质押也逐渐成为了上市公司股东获取融资的重要工具。然而,股权质押在缓解融资压力的同时,也会增加控制权转移风险,此时控股股东倾向于通过盈余管理等手段稳定公司股价,进而对企业的经营管理产生不利影响。创新活动作为企业经营管理的重要一环,是企业在市场上维持竞争力的重要利器,但创新活动需要持续巨额的资金投入,具有较大的投资风险,一旦研发失败可能会给公司股价带来不利冲击,而这正是存在股权质押的控股股东所要极力规避的。因此,企业创新活动的开展,是否会受到控股股东股权质押行为的影响等问题也亟需回答。本文研究控股股东股权质押对企业创新的影响。首先,介绍了我国股权质押与企业创新发展现状,并在梳理相关文献的基础上,论述本文的理论基础与研究假设。其次,本文以中国A股上市公司2013年至2020年的数据为样本,通过实证分析来探究控股股东股权质押与企业创新之间的关系,并进行稳健性检验和内生性分析。此外,本文还从融资约束与掏空动机视角分析了控股股东股权质押影响企业创新的可行机制。最后,本文进一步探讨了企业的产权性质、行业类型、控股股东持股比例以及市场化水平对两者关系的调节作用。本文发现控股股东股权质押显著抑制企业创新,并且在稳健性检验和内生性处理后仍然成立。机制分析表明,控股股东股权质押可能会通过加剧融资约束和强化掏空动机来抑制企业创新。进一步分析发现,控股股东股权质押对民营企业、高科技行业、低控股股东持股比例以及低市场化水平中企业的创新水平抑制效果更为明显。本文的研究具有较强的理论意义和现实意义。理论意义方面,第一,以股权质押为切入点,丰富了以往多从企业特征和外部环境等方面来探讨企业创新影响因素的文献。第二,从企业创新的视角出发,补充了股权质押经济后果的研究。第三,基于信息不对称视角和委托代理视角,完善了股权质押影响企业创新的作用机制研究。现实意义方面,本文的结论为企业优化内部治理,提升创新能力提供决策参考,也为监管部门完善股权质押相关法规提供经验启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 Equity pledge is a financing method for shareholders of listed companies to pledge their shares to financial institutions such as banks to obtain loans.However,while reducing the cost of corporate funds,equity pledge will also increase the risk of control transfer.At this time,enterprise innovation is characterized by high risk,high investment and long cycle,it may bring adverse impact to the company’s stock price,which is what the controlling shareholders with equity pledge want to avoid.Therefore,it is also urgent to answer whether the development of enterprise innovation activities will be restricted due to the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity.Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2020,this thesis explores the relationship between equity pledge of controlling shareholders and enterprise innovation through empirical analysis,and carries out robustness test and endogenous analysis.In addition,this thesis also examines the potential mechanism of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge affecting enterprise innovation.Finally,this thesis further discusses the regulatory effect of internal and external factors on the relationship between the two.This thesis finds that controlling shareholders’ equity pledge presents a negative impact on enterprise innovation,which still holds with robustness test and endogenous analysis.Mechanism analysis shows that controlling shareholders’ equity pledge may affect enterprise innovation by intensifying financing constraints and strengthening tunneling motivation.Finally,the inhibiting effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,high-tech industries,companies with a low proportion of controlling shareholders and low level of marketization in their regions.The thesis has strong theoretical and practical significance.Theoretically,it enriches the research on the influencing factors of enterprise innovation and the economic consequences of equity pledge.Practically,it not only provides decision-making reference for improving the innovation ability of enterprises,but also provides experience enlightenment for the regulatory authorities to improve the relevant system of equity pledge.更多还原