【作者】 黄丽；

【导师】 武玉坤；

【作者基本信息】 华南农业大学 ， 行政管理， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 自我国开启绩效导向的预算改革以来,如何有序推进改革进程成为学界和政界共同关注的话题。既有研究认为影响预算绩效管理有效推进的主要因素在于:缺乏强有力的法律法规支持、绩效结果难落实以及评价体系不完善等制度和技术方面,少有从绩效评价主体角度进行探讨。财政支出绩效评价主体主要涉及财政部门、支出部门和第三方,但既有关于政府间财政分权和财政联邦主义的相关研究,无助于解释政府内部不同部门间的财政关系。主体间的互动贯穿了整个预算绩效管理过程,探究影响预算绩效管理改革因素,主体不容忽视。本文从不完全契约理论视角出发,探究在契约关系中,财政部门作为主体间关系核心纽带,如何发挥对同级别职能部门的约束力?支出部门又会以何种策略方式为自己谋求更好的绩效结果?第三方又是如何对结果发生影响?这将使得我们在新的研究视角下,更加明晰绩效评价主体间互动关系对绩效评价结果的影响,提供一个反映中国地方横向职能部门间相互合作又相互制约的互动机制,进而帮助更好的理解中国行政体制下横向政府间的运作逻辑。本文以G省为例,通过阐述实践层面与制度层面评价过程中相悖离的有趣现象,从不完全契约视角探讨主体间互动行为选择背后的逻辑。研究发现,现阶段预算内绩效评价结果实为“商定”而来,导致绩效结果的失真。尽管制度上明确规定了地方人大、财政部门、支出部门和评价第三方等预算参与主体的职责范围,但实践中出现了财政部门对绩效目标的要求和批复较为随意,绩效评价中财政部门也因工作原因要求时紧时松;支出部门的目标申报较为草率,对绩效评价的配合程度也存在较大差异的现象。上述行为看似随意,实际上隐含着行为主体的策略性行为选择,其行为选择背后的主要原因在于契约不可能被完全拟定的情况下,人们的有限理性、交易事项的不确定性以及信息的不完全性,导致评价主体间明晰所有权成本过高。基于目标难以全面预测,财政部门与支出部门之间通过预算目标软约束来实现目标管理;基于同级别政府间,缺乏权威约束,财政部门对支出部门通过行使“剩余控制权”进行管理;基于共同契约目标追求,支出部门对财政部门、第三方通过行使“剩余索取权”来进行利己目标设置,第三方通过行使“剩余设置权”来进行指标修改设置。因此,也正是由于评价主体间的策略性行为互动带来了“协商绩效”,进而导致评价结果的失真。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the nearly 20 years since my country started the reform of budget performance,how to promote the reform process in an orderly manner has become a common concern of academic and political circles.Existing studies believe that the main factors that affect the effective promotion of budget performance management are: lack of strong legal and regulatory support,difficulty in implementing performance results,and imperfect evaluation systems.There are few discussions from the perspective of performance evaluation subjects.The main body of fiscal expenditure performance evaluation mainly involves the fiscal department and expenditure department,but the existing research on fiscal decentralization and fiscal federalism among governments does not help explain the fiscal relationship between different departments within the government.The interaction between the main bodies runs through the entire budget performance management process,and the main body cannot be ignored when exploring the factors affecting the budget performance management reform.From the perspective of incomplete contract theory,this article explores how the financial sector,as the core link of the relationship between subjects,can exert its binding force on the functional departments at the same level in the contractual relationship.What strategies will the spending department use to seek better performance results for itself? How does the third party intervene in results? This will allow us to clarify the impact of the interaction between performance evaluation subjects on performance evaluation results from a new research perspective,and provide an interactive mechanism that reflects the mutual cooperation and mutual restriction of China’s local horizontal functional departments,and thus helps to better understand The logic of operation between horizontal governments under the Chinese administrative system.Taking Province G as an example,this article discusses the logic behind the choice of interactive behavior between evaluation subjects from the perspective of contract by explaining the interesting phenomenon of the contradiction between the evaluation process at the practical level and the system level.The study found that performance results at this stage are actually "agreed",leading to distortion of performance results.Although the system clearly stipulates the responsibilities of budget participants such as local people’s congresses,financial departments,expenditure departments,and third-party evaluations,in practice,the financial department’s requirements and approvals for performance targets are relatively random.The requirements for work reasons are tight and loose;the expenditure department’s target declaration is rather sloppy,and there are also large differences in the degree of cooperation in the performance evaluation.The above behaviors seem random,but they actually imply the strategic behavior choices of the actors.The main reason behind the behavior choices lies in the bounded rationality of people,the uncertainty of transaction matters,and information when the contract cannot be fully drafted.The incompleteness of the evaluation results in the high cost of clarifying all rights among the evaluation subjects.Based on the difficulty of comprehensive prediction of the target,the financial department and the expenditure department implement the target management through the soft constraint of the budget target;based on the same level of government,lack of authoritative constraints,the financial department manages the expenditure department through the exercise of "residual control";based on common Pursuing the contract goal,the expenditure department sets self-interested goals for the financial department and the third party through the exercise of the “residual claim right”,and the third party uses the“residual setting right” to modify and set indicators.Therefore,it is precisely because the strategic behavior interaction between the evaluation subjects brings about the "negotiation performance",which leads to the distortion of the evaluation results.更多还原