【作者】 周莉；

【导师】 何勇；

【作者基本信息】 东南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2023， 硕士

【摘要】 冻鲜品作为一种可以远距离运输和储存的生鲜食品,能够满足远离原产地的消费者对于多样化食品的需求。但是,冻鲜品对冷链环境的高要求也加剧了供应链管理的难度,此外冻鲜品安全事件的频繁发生,也使得消费者对冻鲜品品质和安全的需求不断提升。供应链溯源系统对保障消费者安全、提升消费者信心具有至关重要的作用,通过对各个环节溯源信息的披露和对冻鲜品保鲜的努力,能够打造具有品牌效应的冻鲜品品牌,不仅提高了消费者的忠诚度和信任度,也提高了供应链成员的竞争力和盈利能力。考虑到溯源建设成本高、投入巨大,且具有长期性、动态性的特点,为了实现溯源系统可持续健康发展,供应链成员应如何选择适宜的合作模式协同推进溯源建设,以及在政府为保障消费者权益对所售冻鲜品进行溯源信息失真监管时,供应链内部应如何选择适宜的监管模式激励建设、规避风险,是当下亟需解决的问题。基于此,本文刻画了冻鲜品供应链溯源透明度和品牌形象的状态方程,构建了由单个冻鲜品自营平台和单个冻鲜品供应商构成的二级冻鲜品供应链,采用微分博弈的方法从合作模式和监管模式两方面研究了冻鲜品供应链的溯源动态投入决策。研究发现:(1)冻鲜品的溯源透明度和品牌形象会因各种因素的作用而发生变化,但随着时间的推移最终会趋向一个稳态水平,在投资建设时,需考虑该状态变量的初始水平,当初始水平高于一定阈值,进一步的投资反而会使状态变量值随时间推移不断下降;(2)当冻鲜品自营平台依据供应商溯源信息披露力度对其进行补贴时,补贴水平越高,对提升上游供应商投入水平的效果越好,在此合作模式下,供应链成员的利润水平均高于无激励模式下;(3)在供应链成员间的合作密切程度达到理想状态即实现协同合作时,冻鲜品的溯源透明度、品牌形象、供应链成员的利润都达到最优水平,此时通过动态收益分配机制的建立能够使得该合作关系随时间变化具有稳定性,避免了供应链中始终存在的信息不对称和利益冲突等问题使得协同合作难以持续发展;(4)政府会通过监管行为要求检测出溯源信息失真的企业缴纳罚金,以此激励供应链成员不断加强溯源建设,实现消费者权益的保障,此时,冻鲜品自营平台会选择加入平台监管或引入政府采信的第三方认证机构对供应商进行监管的方式规避风险,这三种监管方式都能有效激励供应商提升溯源信息披露力度,且其激励效果和供应商增加溯源投入以降低溯源信息失真的程度、认证标签对提升品牌形象的效用正向相关;(5)当冻鲜品自营平台以惩罚的方式激励供应商提升溯源信息披露力度时,需权衡监管力度、监管效果、监管成本间的关系,避免管理成本的支出并没有带来正向的收益。当冻鲜品自营平台以引入第三方认证的方式激励供应商提升溯源信息披露力度时,能够有效提升供应链整体的利润空间,并通过利润的合理分配实现更优的激励效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Frozen fresh products,as a type of fresh food that can be transported and stored over long distances,can meet the diversified needs of consumers who are far away from the place of origin.However,the high requirements of the cold chain environment for frozen fresh products also increase the difficulty of supply chain management.In addition,frequent safety incidents related to frozen fresh products have raised consumers’ demands for product quality and safety.Supply chain traceability systems play a crucial role in ensuring consumer safety and boosting consumer confidence.By disclosing traceability information at each link and making efforts to preserve frozen fresh products,a brand effect can be created,which not only improves consumer loyalty and trust,but also enhances the competitiveness and profitability of supply chain members.Given the high cost and significant investment required for traceability system development,as well as the long-term and dynamic nature of such systems,it is crucial for supply chain members to select appropriate collaboration models to promote traceability system development in a sustainable and healthy manner.Additionally,when governments implement traceability information distortion monitoring to protect consumer rights,it is essential for supply chain members to choose appropriate regulatory models to encourage development and mitigate risks.These are pressing issues that need to be addressed.To this end,we outlines the state equation for transparency and brand image in the frozen fresh product supply chain traceability system,constructs a two-tier frozen fresh product supply chain consisting of a single frozen fresh product self-operated platform and a single frozen fresh product supplier,and uses differential games to investigate the dynamic investment decision-making of the frozen fresh product supply chain from both collaboration and regulation perspectives.The results show that:(1)The transparency of traceability and brand image of frozen fresh products will change due to various factors,but eventually tend towards a steady state level over time.When investing in construction,the initial level of this state variable must be considered.If the initial level is already above a certain threshold,further investment will actually cause the variable to decrease over time.(2)When the frozen fresh product selfoperated platform subsidizes upstream suppliers based on their traceability information disclosure effort level,the higher the subsidy level,the better the effect of improving the effort level of upstream suppliers.Under this cooperation model,the profit level of supply chain members is higher than that under the non-incentive model.(3)When the degree of cooperation between supply chain members reaches the ideal state of synergy,the transparency of traceability,brand image,and profit level of supply chain members all reach optimal levels.At this time,the establishment of a dynamic revenue distribution mechanism can make this cooperative relationship stable over time,avoiding the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest that always exist in the supply chain,making it difficult to sustain cooperation.(4)The government will require companies that detect distorted traceability information to pay fines through regulatory behavior to encourage supply chain members to continuously strengthen traceability construction and safeguard consumer rights.At this time,the frozen fresh product self-operated platform will choose to join platform supervision or introduce government-accredited third-party certification institutions to regulate suppliers to avoid risks.These three regulatory methods can effectively stimulate suppliers to improve their traceability information disclosure efforts,and the incentive effect and the suppliers’ efforts to reduce the degree of traceability information distortion and the utility of certification labels to improve brand image are positively correlated.(4)When the frozen fresh product self-operated platform uses punishment to encourage suppliers to improve their traceability information disclosure effort level,it is necessary to weigh the relationship between regulatory strength,regulatory effectiveness,and regulatory costs to avoid spending management costs without bringing positive returns.When the frozen fresh product selfoperated platform uses third-party certification to encourage suppliers to improve their traceability information disclosure effort level,it can effectively improve the overall profit space of the supply chain and achieve better incentive effects through reasonable profit distribution.更多还原