合格境外机构投资者持股对大股东掏空行为影响的实证研究

【作者】 杨鑫；

【导师】 周雪梅；

【作者基本信息】 贵州大学 ， 金融， 2023， 硕士

【摘要】 中国上市公司存在股权结构复杂、交叉持股等现象,由此导致大股东掏空现象屡见不鲜,“安邦系”“明天系”“华信系”等集团因风险暴露面临接管或处置,耗时长、影响大、成本高。这些企业的掏空行为导致行业风险与金融风险交叉传递,损害中小股东利益,威胁经济社会稳定。自2002年实施QFII制度以来,中国不断降低合格境外机构投资者准入门槛、扩大投资范围、放宽投资限额。随着政策放宽,越来越多合格境外机构投资者持有中国上市公司股票,QFII能否通过其专业的公司治理能力抑制中国上市公司中存在的大股东掏空行为,维护中小投资者利益。本文从这个问题出发,探究QFII持股与大股东掏空二者之间的关系。本文在梳理大股东掏空与QFII相关研究成果的基础上,以2012-2021十年间中国A股上市公司数据为样本,采用面板固定效应模型分析QFII对大股东掏空的影响、QFII对不同产权企业的影响以及不同机构投资者对大股东掏空的影响。实证结果表明,我国上市公司确实存在大股东掏空现象,合格境外机构投资者持股能够抑制上市公司大股东掏空行为,二者呈负相关关系,随着QFII持股比例上升,能与大股东形成更强的制约关系,进而避免掏空行为;在国有企业中存在更为普遍的大股东掏空现象,QFII持股对国有企业大股东掏空的抑制作用要优于非国有企业;研究还发现相对于本土机构投资者来说,QFII对大股东掏空的抑制作用更明显。在考虑内生性问题后实证结果仍然成立,通过替换被解释变量和改变样本数量进行稳健性检验,实证结果与前文基本一致。最后,本文从推进QFII增持我国上市公司、搭建企业信息对接服务平台,完善法律法规三方面提出建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chinese listed companies have a complex shareholding structure and cross-shareholding,resulting in the phenomenon of emptying by major shareholders,and groups such as the "Anbang System","Tomorrow System" and "Huaxin System" are facing takeover or disposal due to The risk of exposure to takeover or disposal is time-consuming,high-impact and costly.The short-selling behavior of these companies has led to the cross-transmission of industry and financial risks,harming the interests of small and medium shareholders and threatening economic and social stability.Since the implementation of the QFII system in 2002,China has continuously lowered the entry threshold,expanded the investment scope and relaxed the investment limits for qualified foreign institutional investors.With the relaxation of the policy,more and more QFIIs hold stocks of Chinese listed companies.Can QFIIs suppress the existence of large shar eholders’ short-selling behaviors in Chinese listed companies through their professional corporate governance capabilities and safeguard the interests of small and medium-sized investors.This paper explores the relationship between QFII shareholding and large shareholder short-selling from this issue.Based on the research results related to the emptying of major shareholders and QFII,this paper analyzes the impact of QFII on the emptying of major shareholders,the impact of QFII on enterprises with different property rights and the impact of different institutional investors on the emptying of major shareholders using a panel fixed effects model with the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in the decade of 2012-2021 as a sample.The empirical results show that the phenomenon of large shareholder shelling does exist in listed companies in China,and the shareholding of QFIIs can inhibit the shelling behavior of large shareholders in listed companies,and the two are negatively correlated,and as the proportion of QFIIs’ shareholding increases,it can form a stronger restraining rela tionship with large shareholders and thus avoid the shelling behavior;the phenomenon of large shareholder shelling exists more commonly in state-owned enterprises,and QFIIs’ shareholding has a stronger inhibitory effect on state-owned enterprises.The study also finds that QFIIs have a more pronounced inhibitory effect on major shareholder short-selling than local institutional investors.The empirical results still hold after considering the endogeneity issue.By replacing the explanatory variables and changing the sample size for the ro bustness test,the empirical results are basically consistent with the previous paper.Finally,this paper puts forward suggestions in three aspects,namely,promoting QFIIs to increase their holdings of China’s listed companies,building an enterprise information matching service platform,and improving laws and regulations.更多还原