【作者】 刘畅；

【导师】 李谭；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 国际贸易学， 2023， 硕士

【副题名】基于1991-2019年美国总统选举的实证研究

【摘要】 尽管近年来经济全球化遭遇逆流挑战,但国际经济开放合作仍是不可阻挡的发展大势。在开放型世界经济下,贸易保护主义不断抬头,沉重阻碍着全球化步伐。反倾销是当今操作最频繁且覆盖范围最广泛的贸易保护手段,有效庇护发起国企业发展的同时,也给经济全球化深入发展带来更多不确定性和不稳定性。细致分析发起反倾销的目的和原因有助于防范贸易风险,帮助国内企业更好参与全球化经济。美国作为发起反倾销最多的国家之一,行为决策不仅受到内外部经济因素影响,可能还有来自政治因素的重要作用。美国总统选举具有明确的政治周期,导致总统存在强烈的选举动机,可能借助国家贸易政策促进竞选。本文使用1991-2019年美国对外发起反倾销的数据,充分考虑摇摆州在政治周期中的重要性,利用美国总统选举结果数据和美国就业数据生成摇摆州行业重要性指标,作为政治重要性的衡量,以探讨美国总统选举和发起反倾销行为之间的关系,重点考查政治因素对反倾销行为的影响,从而揭示反倾销的政治周期特征。由于摇摆州行业重要性可能与发起反倾销行为之间存在反向因果关系,为处理内生性问题,我们使用样本前数据构建了有效的工具变量,使用最小二乘法验证了结果的稳健性。研究表明,摇摆州行业重要性显著影响了美国发起反倾销行为。基于选举动机,美国更可能对摇摆州的重要行业发起反倾销,并且发起次数可能更多,但最终不一定会征收更高的反倾销税率。我们认为,美国发起反倾销行为具有明显的政治意图。美国总统基于选举动机,会利用职权发起反倾销维护摇摆州选民的经济利益,通过频繁发起反倾销不断向摇摆州选民示好,强调和摇摆州选民利益一致的政治立场,获得摇摆州选民的好感,以争取摇摆州主要群体的关键选票,为总统大选造势,提高成功当选的可能性。反倾销的发起行为足够实现总统的政治动机,同时易于操作,适宜频繁使用,而征税行为具有法律效应,可能遭到外国的申诉或惩罚性关税,导致更加严重的经济损失,因此出于利益权衡并不会实际征税。不同于以往文献主要关注时间变量,本文创新行业层面的分析视角,重点探讨美国在政治周期影响下发起进口反倾销在行业上的选择偏向,由此扩展了研究视角,增加了中观层面的实证分析。并从发起反倾销的流程入手,用反倾销税率作为反倾销案件最终结果的衡量,对比论证美国发起反倾销行为的强烈政治动机。本文有助于深化对政治因素影响反倾销的认识,丰富经济学和政治学交叉学科的研究成果。一定程度上能够提高相关部门对政治因素的关注和重视,可能有助于我国相关贸易部门和出口企业及时把握国际贸易环境的变化,提高对美国贸易政策预测的准确性,降低贸易风险,也能为改善出口贸易的外部环境提供新的方向,从加强国际政治交流着手突破。更多还原

【Abstract】 International economic openness and cooperation remains an unstoppable trend,although economic globalization has faced counter-current shocks in recent years.Under the open world economy,trade protectionism is emerging,which seriously hinders the development of globalization.Anti-dumping is the most frequently operated and widely covered trade protection instrument today,which brings more uncertainty and instability to economic globalization while effectively sheltering the development of enterprises in the initiating countries.Therefore,a careful analysis of the purpose and reasons for initiating anti-dumping can help prevent trade risks and better participate in the globalized economy.As one of the countries initiating the most anti-dumping,the U.S.anti-dumping decisions are not only influenced by domestic and foreign economic factors,but may also be influenced by political factors.One of the political factors is the U.S.presidential election,which has a clear political cycle,and the president may draw on national trade policies to promote the success of their campaigns with obviously political intentions.This paper uses the data of U.S.foreign initiation of anti-dumping from1991-2019,combines employment data and the importance of swing states in the political cycle,generates “swing industry” indicators as a measure of the political importance of each industry to swing states,analyzes the correlation between U.S.presidential election and initiation of anti-dumping behavior,and focuses on examining the influence of political factors on anti-dumping behavior,so as to reveal the political cycle characteristics.Since there is a possible reverse causality between swing industry and anti-dumping behavior,to deal with the endogeneity issue,we construct effective instrumental variables and verify the robustness of the results using the least squares method.The study shows that swing industry significantly influences the behavior of the U.S.in initiating antidumping.Based on electoral motives,the U.S.is more likely to initiate anti-dumping against important industries in swing states and may initiate more often,but does not necessarily end up with higher anti-dumping duty rates.We argue that the U.S.initiation of anti-dumping has a clear political intent,specifically,the U.S.president,based on electoral motives,will use his authority to initiate anti-dumping frequently to show goodwill to swing state voters,emphasize political positions that are consistent with the interests of swing state voters,and gain the favor of swing state voters in order to win key votes from key groups in swing states and increase the likelihood of successful election.The initiating act of anti-dumping is sufficient to achieve the president’s political motivation,and it is easy to operate and suitable for frequent use,while the taxing act has legal effects and may be subject to foreign complaints or punitive tariffs,leading to more severe economic losses,and thus is not actually taxed due to the trade-off of interests.Unlike the previous literature,which mainly focuses on the correction about time,this paper innovates the perspective of industry-level analysis and focuses on the selection bias of the U.S.import anti-dumping initiation in the industry under the influence of the political cycle,thus expanding the research perspective and increasing the meso-level empirical analysis.In addition,this paper starts from the process of initiating anti-dumping and measures the final outcome of anti-dumping cases with anti-dumping duty rates to compare and argue the strong political motivation for the U.S.to initiate anti-dumping actions.So this paper helps to deepen the understanding of political factors affecting anti-dumping and enrich the research results of the interdisciplinary study of economics and political science.To a certain extent,it can improve the attention and importance of the relevant departments to political factors,which may help the relevant trade departments and export enterprises in China to grasp the changes in the international trade environment in a timely manner,improve the accuracy of predicting the U.S.trade policy,reduce trade risks,and may provide new directions to strengthen international political exchanges so as to improve the external environment of export trade.更多还原