节点文献

中小股东出席股东大会对企业杠杆率的影响

The Impact of Minority Shareholders’ Attendance at Shareholders’ General Meeting on Corporate Leverage

【作者】 马娟

【导师】 冯国强;

【作者基本信息】 兰州大学 , 金融专硕(专业学位), 2023, 硕士

【副题名】基于年度股东大会出席人数的考察

【摘要】 企业高杠杆率一直是企业生存发展的主要问题,把“去杠杆”作为供给侧结构性改革的突破口和首要改革任务。公司内部治理中,中小股东主人翁意识增强,主动行使表决权来保障自身合法权益,而不再是被动的服从。中小股东出席股东大会参与公司治理,对保障企业经营与发展起着关键作用,也影响企业决策者的决策行为。中小股东参加股东大会对企业杠杆率有何影响?能否有效地降低企业杠杆率?其作用机制如何?对于不同所有制企业以及地区企业来说,其效果有无区别?以上问题的解答,对中小股东参与公司治理的影响提供新的证据,并拓展企业杠杆率相关文献。本文梳理现有关于中小股东参与公司治理与企业杠杆率的相关研究,在此基础上提出理论假设,采用2015-2021年深交所A股主板上市公司数据,手动收集中小股东出席股东大会现场参与人数以及网络投票人数,使用双向固定效应模型检验中小股东出席股东大会对企业杠杆率的影响,并进行异质性分析和机制检验。实证结果表明:(1)中小股东出席股东大会参与公司治理发挥监督效应降低企业杠杆率。(2)异质性分析结果显示,中小股东出席股东大会发挥监督效应对非国企和东部地区企业更加显著。(3)机制检验结果表明,中小股东出席股东大会通过约束控股股东利益侵占行为进而影响企业杠杆率。本文研究结论为中小股东参与公司治理提供新的证据,丰富了企业杠杆率的影响因素,并为企业降低企业杠杆率提供了新的思路和方向,有助于企业保持合理的杠杆率水平,促进企业健康发展,稳定金融市场。

【Abstract】 The high leverage ratio of enterprises has always been the main problem of the survival and development of enterprises,and "deleveraging" is regarded as the breakthrough and primary reform task of supply-side structural reform.In the company’s internal governance,small and medium-sized shareholders have enhanced their sense of ownership and actively exercised their voting rights to protect their legitimate rights and interests,rather than passive obedience.The participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance at the shareholders’ meeting plays a key role in ensuring the operation and development of enterprises,and also affects the decision-making behavior of corporate decision-makers.What is the impact of minority shareholders’ participation in shareholders’ meetings on the leverage ratio of enterprises? Can it effectively reduce corporate leverage? How does it work? Is there a difference in effect for enterprises of different ownership systems and regional enterprises? The answers to the above questions provide new evidence on the impact of minority shareholders’ participation in corporate governance,and expand the literature on corporate leverage ratio.Based on the existing research on the participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance and corporate leverage,this paper puts forward a theoretical hypothesis,uses the data of listed companies on the A-share main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2021,manually collects the number of on-site participants and online voting of minority shareholders attending the shareholders’ meeting,uses the two-way fixed effect model to test the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance at the shareholders’ meeting on the leverage ratio of enterprises,and conducts heterogeneity analysis and mechanism testing.The empirical results show that:(1)Small and medium-sized shareholders attend the shareholders’ meeting,participate in corporate governance,exert a supervisory effect,and reduce the leverage ratio of enterprises.(2)The results of heterogeneity analysis show that the supervision effect of minority shareholders attending shareholders’ meetings is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises in the eastern region.(3)The results of the mechanism test show that the participation of minority shareholders at the shareholders’ general meeting affects the leverage ratio of the enterprise by restraining the encroachment of the interests of the controlling shareholders.The research conclusion of this paper provides new evidence for the participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance,enriches the influencing factors of corporate leverage ratio,and provides new ideas and directions for enterprises to reduce corporate leverage ratio,which is helpful for enterprises to maintain a reasonable level of leverage ratio,promote the healthy development of enterprises,and stabilize the financial market.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 兰州大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2024年 02期
  • 【分类号】F271;F275;F832.51
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络