【作者】 薛莲；

【导师】 杨永淼；

【作者基本信息】 山东农业大学 ， 会计（专业学位）， 2023， 硕士

【摘要】 当前,我国资本市场搭上了时代发展的“顺风车”,把握时代带来的机遇,加足马力快速发展,仅沪深A股上市公司数量就接近5000家。与此同时,资本市场在发展过程中也面临着一些挑战。例如,控股股东占用上市公司资金的情况屡禁不止。据统计可知,如今超八成的上市公司存在控股股东控制的情况。在此背景下,控股股东倾向于利用自己的股权优势实施掏空行为。虽然企业内部已经设立了较完善的内部控制和监督体系,外部监管机构也在不断加大监管处罚力度,力争有效遏制此类行为,但现实中仍难以预防、发现并控制,最终不仅威胁到上市公司的发展,也侵犯了中小投资者和债权人的权益,阻碍了资本市场的良性健康发展。本文运用了文献研究法和案例分析法两种方法。首先,介绍与控股股东掏空相关的理论概念,如控股股东、掏空行为等,并且对委托代理理论、控制权收益理论和CRIME理论展开阐述。上述理论为后文分析*ST辅仁控股股东掏空行为和提出对策建议提供了依据。其次,介绍*ST辅仁的具体情况,其中分别介绍了*ST辅仁公司的基本情况、股权结构和组织架构,并回顾了相关的掏空事件。再次,以CRIME理论为模型,从实施掏空的行为人(C)、手段(R)、动机(I)、监管体制(M)、后果(E)五个层面全方位、多角度的进行分析,得出*ST辅仁被掏空的原因以及具体表现。之后,在前文分析的基础上,从上市公司、中介机构、监管机构、投资者四大方面提出对策建议。最后,基于上述分析综合得出研究结论与启示。研究结论发现,上市公司内部“一股独大”的股权结构、“形同虚设”的治理结构、存在缺陷的内部控制是导致控股股东实施掏空行为的根本原因;而外部审计的监督不力、监管机构的监管失效为控股股东实施掏空提供了便利,创造了条件;除此以外,控股股东的不良动机及中小投资者维权意识不足、能力不够、渠道不畅是导致控股股东实施掏空的主要原因。由此,得出研究启示,上市公司若想健康持续发展需要在公司内部优化股权结构、完善治理结构、强化内部控制;除此以外,还要提升外部审计的质量和独立性、加大外部监管的监督和处罚力度;加强对控股股东的引导约束、增强对中小投资者的保护力度。通过以上对*ST辅仁公司控股股东掏空上市公司案例的深入研究,希望能够给上市公司、相关利益方以及外部审计机构、监管部门提供一些借鉴建议,也希望能够为分析资本市场中控股股东掏空上市公司的其他案例提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 At present,China ’s capital market has caught the ’ tailwind ’ of the development of the times,grasped the opportunities brought by the times,and stepped up its rapid development.The number of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies alone is close to 5000.At the same time,the capital market also faces some challenges in the development process.For example,the controlling shareholders occupy the funds of listed companies repeatedly.According to statistics,more than 80 % of listed companies are controlled by controlling shareholders.In this context,controlling shareholders will use their own equity advantages to implement tunneling behavior.Although a relatively complete internal control and supervision system has been established within the enterprise,and external regulatory agencies are also constantly increasing regulatory penalties to strive to effectively curb such acts,it is still difficult to prevent,detect and control in reality.It not only threatens the development of listed companies,but also violates the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and creditors,and hinders the healthy development of the capital market.This paper uses two methods of literature research and case analysis.Firstly,it introduces the theoretical concepts related to the tunneling of controlling shareholders,such as controlling shareholders and tunneling behavior,and expounds the principal-agent theory,control benefit theory and CRIME theory.The above theory provides a basis for the later analysis of * ST Furen ’s controlling shareholder ’s tunneling behavior and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions.Secondly,it introduces the specific situation of * ST Furen’s controlling shareholders ’ tunneling of listed companies,including the basic situation,ownership structure and organizational structure of * ST Furen,and reviews the relevant tunneling events.Thirdly,based on the CRIME theory,this paper makes a comprehensive and multi-angle analysis from five aspects : the actor(C),the means(R),the motivation(I),the regulatory system(M)and the consequences(E),and concludes the reasons and specific performance of * ST Furen being hollowed out.After that,on the basis of the previous analysis,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions from four aspects :listed companies,intermediaries,regulators and investors.Finally,based on the above analysis,the research conclusions and enlightenment are drawn.The conclusion of the study found that the ownership structure of the listed company’s internal ’ dominance ’,the governance structure of the ’ virtual ’,and the defective internal control are the root causes of the controlling shareholder ’s tunneling behavior;the lack of supervision of external audit and the failure of supervision of regulatory agencies have facilitated the implementation of tunneling by controlling shareholders and created conditions;in addition,the bad motivation of controlling shareholders and the lack of awareness,ability and channel of small and medium-sized investors are the main reasons for the tunneling of controlling shareholders.Therefore,it is concluded that if listed companies want to develop healthily and sustainably,they need to optimize the ownership structure,improve the governance structure and strengthen internal control within the company.In addition,it is necessary to improve the quality and independence of external audit,increase the supervision and punishment of external supervision;strengthen the guidance and restraint of controlling shareholders and enhance the protection of small and medium investors.Through the above in-depth study of the case of * ST Furen Company ’s controlling shareholder hollowing out listed companies,we hope to provide some reference suggestions for listed companies,relevant stakeholders,external audit institutions and regulatory authorities,and also hope to provide reference for the analysis of other cases of controlling shareholders hollowing out listed companies in the capital market.更多还原