【作者】 李莹；

【导师】 蒲华林；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 国际贸易学， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来,随着我国市场化改革不断深入,中国民营经济发展速度越来越快。作为我国市场经济重要微观主体,民营企业在扩大就业、增加税收、促进社会稳定等方面做出重要贡献,其地位也得到不断提升。与此同时,民营企业发展问题日益成为影响我国经济发展的重要一环,而民营企业投资水平及效率就是主要问题。一方面,许多民营企业为追求规模成本效应盲目扩大投资,造成投资过度;另一方面,民营企业因存在融资困境无法实现最佳投资规模,导致投资不足。因此,研究我国民营上市企业投资水平及效率,对我国经济发展具有重要意义。我国尚处于经济转型时期,市场体系不够健全,市场化程度还较低,政府在资源配置中仍发挥重要作用,对企业生产经营活动有着重要影响,因此企业为了自身发展通过各种方式与政府建立政治联系。国有企业由国家控股,具有天然政治联系,而民营企业需要通过高管担任人大代表、政协委员或聘用政府官员等途径与政府建立这种关系。已有多数学者研究证实政治联系是一种普遍现象,但政治联系对企业投资影响尚未得出一致结论。一方面,政治联系能够为企业带来资源、政策福利等好处,促进企业投资;另一方面,企业也要付出相应代价,损害企业价值。同时政治联系是民营企业为了应对正式制度尚不完善的市场环境所采取的一种非正式制度安排,其效应发挥也会受到市场化程度影响。因此,深入研究政治联系对民营企业投资影响,并进一步考虑不同市场化程度对这一影响变化情况,有助于理解我国民营企业非效率投资行为产生的深层次原因,对于改善我国民营企业投资行为有重要现实意义。本文以2009-2018年我国沪深A股上市民营企业作为研究样本,首先通过Richardson模型度量投资效率,将模型中正残差定义为投资过度,模型中负残差取绝对值后定义为投资不足,然后分别实证检验政治联系对我国企业投资水平及效率影响,同时探讨政治联系是通过何种渠道影响企业投资,并且进一步考虑不同市场化进程对政治联系与企业投资影响变化情况,最后为保证实证结果稳健性,本文按照替换变量法和改变样本法进行稳健性检验。实证结果显示:(1)民营企业建立政治联系的确促进企业扩大投资支出,缓解企业投资不足,但加剧企业过度投资;(2)市场化进程弱化政治联系对企业投资水平以及效率的影响,同时按照市场化进程进行分组回归后发现,在市场化进程高的地区,政治联系对企业投资影响并不显著;(3)贷款融资规模与贷款融资期限在政治联系与企业投资之间起部分中介作用。本研究具有一定理论意义和现实意义。一方面,本文分别从投资水平和投资效率两个角度出发,研究市场化进程、政治联系与企业投资关系,拓宽了政治联系以及其对投资行为影响研究视角,并为三者关系研究提供经验支持,丰富相关文献。另一方面,本文针对政治联系与企业投资研究表明,政治联系对企业投资不足和投资过度分别产生不同影响,而市场化进程会弱化这种影响,这有助于企业正确认识和理性看待政治联系作用,促使企业从根源上改进投资效率,降低对政治资源的依赖。同时本文根据研究结论提出如下对策建议:(1)加快改进和完善制度环境,积极推进市场化进程;(2)建立有效的政企分开机制,推进政企关系健康发展;(3)不断加强和完善企业内部治理,提升企业管理水平。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,with the deepening of my country’s market-oriented reforms,China’s private economy has developed faster and faster.As an important micro-subject of my country’s market economy,private enterprises play an important role in promoting employment and increasing tax revenue,and their status has also been continuously improved.At the same time,the development of private enterprises has increasingly become an important part of my country’s economic development,and the investment efficiency of private enterprises is the main problem.On the one hand,many private enterprises blindly expand investment in pursuit of scale cost effect,resulting in excessive investment;on the other hand,private enterprises cannot achieve the optimal investment scale due to financing difficulties,resulting in insufficient investment.Therefore,studying the investment efficiency of private listed enterprises in China is of great significance to my country’s economic development.China is still in a period of economic transformation,the market system is not perfect,and the degree of marketization is still low.The government still plays an important role in resource allocation and has an important impact on the production and operation activities of enterprises.Therefore,for their own development,enterprises have established political connect.State-owned enterprises are controlled by the state and have natural political connections,while private enterprises need to establish this relationship with the government by joining the enterprise through executives serving as deputies to the National People’s Congress,members of the CPPCC,or hiring government officials.Most scholars’ studies have confirmed that political connections are a common phenomenon,but the impact of political connections on corporate investment has not reached a consistent conclusion.On the one hand,political connections can bring resources,policy benefits and other benefits to enterprises,and promote enterprise investment;on the other hand,enterprises have to pay a corresponding price and damage their value.Therefore,an in-depth study of the impact of political ties on the investment of private enterprises,and further considering the changes in the impact of different degrees of marketization,will help to understand thedeep-seated reasons for the inefficient investment behavior of private enterprises in china,and will help improve the investment behavior of private enterprises in china.This paper takes the private enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in my country from 2009 to 2018 as the research sample.First,the Richardson model is used to measure the investment efficiency.The positive residual in the model is defined as overinvestment,and the negative residual in the model is defined as the absolute value.Insufficient investment,and then empirically test the impact of political ties on the investment level and efficiency of Chinese enterprises,and explore the channels through which political ties affect corporate investment expenditures,and finally consider the changes in the impact of different marketization processes on political ties and corporate investment.The empirical results show that:(1)the establishment of political ties by private enterprises does promote the expansion of investment expenditures and alleviates the under-investment of enterprises,but it aggravates the over-investment of enterprises;(2)the impact of the weakening of political ties in the process of marketization on the level of investment and efficiency of enterprises At the same time,after grouping regression according to the marketization process,it is found that there are differences in the impact of different marketization degrees on the two;(3)The loan financing scale and loan financing period play a partial intermediary role between political connections and corporate investment expenditures.The research conclusions of this paper provide empirical support for political ties and corporate investment relations,and expand the perspective of private enterprises’ political ties and their investment behavior research.This study has certain theoretical and practical significance.On the one hand,from the perspective of investment level and investment efficiency,this paper studies the market-oriented process,political connection and enterprise investment relationship,broadens the research perspective of political connection and its impact on investment behavior,provides empirical support for the research of the relationship between the three and enriches relevant literature.On the other hand,the research on political connection and enterprise investment shows that political connection has different effects on enterprise under-investment and over-investment,and the marketization process will weaken this effect,which helps enterprises correctly understand and rationally view the role of political connection,promote enterprises to improve investment efficiency from the root and reduce their dependence on political resources.At the same time,according to the research conclusions,this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions:(1)speed up the improvement and improvement of the institutional environment and actively promote the process of marketization;(2)Establish an effective separation mechanism between government and enterprises to promote the healthy development of government enterprise relations;(3)Continuously strengthen and improve the internal governance of enterprises and improve the management level of enterprises.更多还原