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金科股份反收购案例研究
A Case Study of Anti-takeover for Jinke
【作者】 杨丽;
【导师】 肖万;
【作者基本信息】 华南理工大学 , 会计硕士(专业学位), 2022, 硕士
【摘要】 股权分置改革后,伴随而来是敌意收购事件的频发,为守卫控制权,上市公司采取多种措施进行反收购。我国反收购成功的案例屈指可数,金科股份是继万科后第二个房企反收购成功的案例。金科股份持续了四年的同行业股权争夺案引起关注,在2020年4月14日以融创中国的减持来标志这场反收购战落下了帷幕,说明金科股份采取的反收购措施有效,丰富我国的反收购案例,为其他公司提供经验参考,具有理论和现实意义。本文运用了文献研究法、案例研究法和事件研究法,介绍了房地产行业、金科股份、融创中国、收购与反收购过程,分析了实施反收购措施的原因和效果,未选用其他反收购措施的原因,反收购效果及给实施措施的弊端。研究发现金科股份创始股东因创始人情结、争夺土储资源、维护创始股东和管理层的利益、公司价值被低估等原因坚持反收购。金科股份采用了多种反收购措施。其中,较为有效的是修改章程、紧急停牌、增加一致行动人和员工持股,既能阻止对方占据多个董事会席位,增加己方持股比例,还能稳定股价。进一步发现,反收购驱赶了敌意收购方,稳定公司的治理结构,提升了经营规模、获利能力和行业地位,敌意收购方看准时机减持获得了巨额收益。同时,反收购措施也给上市公司留下了弊端,包括大股东集权、中小股东发表意见难、大股东掏空程度增加带来的治理约束弱化,规模扩张、增加负债等增加的偿债压力,以及反收购行为引来交易所多次问询等。本文认为,反收购要做好利益主体之间的利益平衡,不能侵害部分利益主体的利益。其次,选用何种措施要依据公司实际情况、收购方的增持状态、双方持股比例接近程度来抉择,让措施达到设置董事会障碍、提高收购成本、增加己方持股比例的效果。再次,上市公司反收购应完善内部治理制度、加强风险监测。最后,政府监管部门加强监管,减少反收购产生的相关弊端。本文的研究为上市公司反收购带来启示,给创始股东选择正确的反收购措施提供参考,为推进完善收购机制的建设提供研究证据。
【Abstract】 After the reform of non-tradable shares,there are frequent hostile takeover events.In order to guard the control right,listed companies take a variety of anti-takeover measures.There are few successful cases of anti-acquisition in China.Jinke is the second successful case of anti-acquisition of real estate enterprises after Vanke.Jinke’s four-year equity fight in the same industry has attracted attention.On April 14,2020,Sunac’s shareholding reduction marked the end of the anti-takeover war,indicating that the anti-takeover measures taken by Jinke are effective,enrich the anti-takeover cases in China,and provide experience reference for other companies,with theoretical and practical significance.This thesis uses literature research method,case study method and event study method,introduces the real estate industry,Jinke,Sunac,acquisition and anti-acquisition process,analyzes the reasons and effects of the implementation of anti-acquisition measures,the reasons for not choosing other anti-acquisition measures,the effect of anti-acquisition and the shortcomings of the implementation measures.The study found that the founding shareholders of Jinke insisted on opposing the takeover because of founder complex,competing for land reserves,safeguarding the interests of founding shareholders and management,and undervaluation of the company.Jinke has used a variety of anti-takeover measures.Among them,the more effective ones are to amend the articles of association,suspend trading in an emergency manner,increase collective action and employee stock ownership,which can not only prevent the other party from occupying more than one board seat,increase its own share ratio,but also stabilize the stock price.It is further found that anti-takeover drives out the hostile acquirer,stabilizes the corporate governance structure,improves the scale of operation,profitability and industry status,and the hostile acquirer gains huge profits by reducing its holdings at the right time.At the same time,anti-takeover measures have left disadvantages for listed companies,including the centralization of major shareholders,the difficulty of small and medium shareholders to express their opinions,the weakening of governance constraints brought by the increase of the degree of hollowing by major shareholders,the increase of debt and other debt paying pressure,and the anti-takeover behavior attracted many inquiries from exchanges,etc.This thesis argues that anti-takeover should balance the interests between the main interests and not infringe on the interests of some main interests.Secondly,the choice of measures should be based on the actual situation of the company,the acquirer’s shareholding increase status,and the closeness of the shareholding ratio between the two parties,so that the measures can achieve the effect of setting up barriers to the board of directors,increasing the acquisition cost and increasing its shareholding ratio.Thirdly,anti-takeover of listed companies should also improve internal governance system,strengthen risk monitoring.Finally,the government supervision departments to strengthen supervision,reduce anti-takeover related abuses.The research of this paper provides enlightenment for anti-takeover of listed companies,provides reference for founding shareholders to choose the right anti-takeover measures,and provides research evidence for promoting the construction of perfect takeover mechanism.
- 【网络出版投稿人】 华南理工大学 【网络出版年期】2024年 09期
- 【分类号】F271;F299.233.4