【作者】 王帅；

【导师】 王雄元；

【作者基本信息】 中南财经政法大学 ， 财务管理， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 中国推行“有效市场+有为政府”的特色社会主义市场经济,中国政府长期在资源配置中发挥主导作用。十八届三中全会之后资源配置由政府主导转向市场主导,准入管制的放松使得企业可以在“法无禁止即可为”的前提下自由进入行业市场领域,这些制度环境的重大变化必然影响微观企业主体的投资并购行为,然而针对这一问题的研究相对较少。本文以市场准入负面清单制度试点为实验场景,基于2012-2019年沪深两市A股上市公司的并购事件,采用多时点双重差分的方法探究市场准入管制放松如何影响企业并购活动。研究发现:(1)市场准入负面清单政策的实施促进了企业并购,具体表现为并购倾向提高和并购规模增加,说明该政策的实施促进了并购市场活力。这一结论在经过平行趋势、倾向得分匹配、安慰剂测试、替换变量度量方法以及控制相似政策因素影响等稳健性检验后依然保持不变。(2)市场准入负面清单政策实施后企业并购绩效显著增加,具体表现为并购后一至两年内公司市场价值、全要素生产率、人力资源效率、创新效率的提升,说明放松管制后市场环境主导下的兼并收购活动获得了良好的“协同效应”。(3)准入管制放松后并购的财务绩效没有提高,但是企业总体生产效率和创新效率明显提升,并且总体市场价值显著提升,说明管制放松后企业并购存在以“盈利”换“效率”的动态权衡。(4)进一步的机制检验发现,市场准入负面清单政策对并购活动的促进效果主要存在于异地并购组、非国有企业组、无政治关系组、低政府补贴组,说明负面清单政策通过减弱地区歧视、所有制歧视、关系歧视以及扶持意愿歧视,提高竞争的公平性,从而增加并购市场活力。同时,这一现象还主要存在于政府对市场竞争干预程度较高组以及行业竞争程度较高的分组,说明负面清单政策通过培育市场竞争环境,提高竞争的充分性,进而促进企业并购。本文首次在政府与市场关系发生巨大转变的背景下对我国上市公司并购行为进行研究,发现并购资源配置主导权由政府让位于市场能够促进并购,不仅能够丰富并购的“制度环境因素”假说,还补充了管制放松经济后果的文献。其次,本文从竞争视角进行研究,发现市场准入管制放松的作用机制是提高竞争的公平性和充分性,从而提高企业并购意愿和并购绩效,丰富了竞争与投资的相关文献。最后,本文的现实意义在于以实证方式对负面清单政策的作用效果进行了评估,发现这一制度确实可以优化资源配置、降低制度性交易成本、促进经济效率提升,为我国进一步深化“放管服”改革、创造更加开放公平的营商环境提供了理论参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 China promotes a characteristic socialist market economy of "effective market and promising government",and the Chinese government has long played a leading role in resource allocation.After the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,the Chinese government’s role in resource allocation has changed from a leading role to a macro-control role,while the market role has changed from a basic role to a decisive role.The deregulation of market access allows enterprises to enter the market freely under the premise of "doing what is not prohibited by law".This major change in the institutional environment will inevitably affect the M&A behavior of microenterprise entities.However,there are few studies on this issue.This article uses the market access negative list system pilot as an experimental scenario.Based on the mergers and acquisitions of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2019,this thesis uses a multi-point double differential method to explore how the deregulation of market access affects corporate mergers and acquisitions.This research found that:(1)The implementation of the market access negative list policy has promoted corporate mergers and acquisitions.The specific manifestations are the increase in the tendency of mergers and acquisitions and the increase in the scale of mergers and acquisitions,indicating that the implementation of the policy has promoted the vitality of the mergers and acquisitions market.This conclusion remains unchanged after the robustness tests of parallel trends,propensity score matching,placebo testing,substitution variable measurement methods,and controlling the influence of similar policy factors.(2)After the implementation of the market access negative list policy,the performance of corporate mergers and acquisitions has increased significantly,which is manifested in the improvement of the company’s market value,total factor productivity,human resource efficiency,and innovation efficiency within one to two years after the merger,indicating that the merger and acquisition activities of the company led by the market have achieved good "synergies" after the deregulation.(3)The financial performance of mergers and acquisitions has not improved after the deregulation of access control,but the overall production efficiency and innovation efficiency of enterprises have been significantly improved,and the overall market value has been significantly improved,indicating that there is a dynamic of "profit" for "efficiency" in mergers and acquisitions after deregulation trade off.(4)Further mechanism inspection found that the promotion effect of the market access negative list policy on M&A activities mainly exists in the trans-provincial M&A group,the non-state-owned enterprise group,the non-political group,and the low government subsidy group,indicating that the negative list policy has weakened the region discrimination,ownership discrimination,relationship discrimination,and support willingness discrimination,which can improve the fairness of competition,thereby increasing the vitality of the M&A market.At the same time,this phenomenon mainly exists in groups with a high degree of government intervention and a high degree of industry competition,indicating that the negative list policy fosters a market competition environment and enhances the adequacy of competition,thereby promoting mergers and acquisitions.This article is the first to study the mergers and acquisitions of listed companies under the background of huge changes in the relationship between the government and the market,and finds that the change of dominant power of merger resource allocation by the government can promote mergers and acquisitions.It has not only can enrich the "institutional environmental factors" hypothesis of mergers and acquisitions,but also supplements the literature on the economic consequences of deregulation.Secondly,this thesis conducts research from the perspective of competition and finds that the mechanism of market access control deregulation is to improve the fairness and adequacy of competition,thereby increasing the willingness and performance of mergers and acquisitions,and has enriched the literature on competition and investment.Finally,the practical significance of this article is to evaluate the effects of the negative list policy in an empirical manner,and find that this policy can indeed optimize resource allocation,reduce institutional transaction costs,and promote economic efficiency,which will further deepen the “delegation,regulation,and service” reform and create a more open and fair business environment provide for our country.更多还原