【作者】 张晓；

【导师】 宋妍；

【作者基本信息】 中国矿业大学 ， 产业经济学， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 粗放型的发展模式带来的生态环境恶化问题严重制约着我国经济的可持续发展。为扭转严峻的资源环境形势,中央政府基于生态文明理念制定颁布了一系列环境规制政策。而在经济“新常态”下,需要完成供给侧结构性改革、新旧动能转换、经济发展模式向高质量转变等战略目标,此时环境规制作为一项资源生态约束性政策,能否有效促进产业结构升级是发展突破的关键所在。此外,在相对绩效考核机制形成的“标尺竞争”下,地方政府在环境规制的执行上会参考周边地区同级政府的行为,使得地方政府间的环境治理行为不再是独立的,而是存在策略互动的。因此本文基于地方政府间策略互动的视角下,来探究环境规制策略互动行为及其对产业结构升级的影响。首先,在梳理了环境规制、产业结构升级、地方政府间策略互动的相关理论与研究的基础上,对环境规制策略互动及其影响产业结构升级的作用机理进行分析。其次,在对样本期内环境规制与产业结构升级的发展现状以及空间相关性进行考察之后,借助我国2004-2019年内陆30个省份的面板数据,构建空间杜宾模型,实证检验了环境规制策略互动及其对产业结构升级的影响效应。最后,从区域和时序两个方面展开异质性研究,并基于时序异质性结果进一步引入环境绩效考核指标,以探究官员政绩考核绿色化对环境规制策略互动与产业结构升级影响关系的调节作用。主要结论如下:(1)产业结构升级在样本期间内存在显著的空间集聚效应,即表现为空间正相关。本地区产业结构升级水平的提高对周边地区的产业结构升级具有推动作用,反之亦然。(2)全样本和分区域检验结果显示,我国整体与东部地区地方政府间在环境规制执行上存在策略互动行为,且都表现为“逐顶竞争”形式,环境规制对本地区和周边地区的产业结构升级均存在正向促进作用;中西部地区样本下,地方政府间环境规制策略互动表现为“逐底竞争”形式,环境规制对本地区和周边地区的产业结构升级均存在负向抑制作用。(3)分时段结果显示,在2004-2007时段,地方政府间环境规制策略互动呈现出“逐底竞争”形式,环境规制对本地区和周边地区的产业结构升级均存在负向抑制作用;在2008-2012时段,根据产业结构高级化的结果,地方政府间环境规制策略互动呈现出“差别化竞争”形式,环境规制对本地区产业结构升级具有促进作用,对周边地区的产业结构升级存在负向空间溢出效应;而2013-2019时段的回归结果与全时段基本一致。(4)随着官员政绩考核机制的绿色化,全样本和东部地区样本下,环境绩效考核指标不仅会强化环境规制对产业结构升级的本地促进作用,还会强化“逐顶竞争”策略互动下环境规制对周边地区产业结构升级的正向空间溢出效应;中西部地区样本下,环境绩效考核指标会在一定程度上改变地方政府间原来的“逐底竞争”策略,向着有利于地区环境治理与产业结构升级的方向转变。最后,基于上述研究结论,本文从加强宏观调控、加强环境管理集权、制定差异化环保政策、推动政绩考核绿色化几个方面提出了合理可行的政策建议。该论文有图16张,表16个,参考文献148篇。更多还原

【Abstract】 The deterioration of ecological environment caused by the extensive development model seriously restricts the sustainable development of China’s economy.In order to reverse the severe situation of resources and environment,the central government has formulated and promulgated a series of environmental regulation policies based on the concept of ecological civilization.At the same time,under the "new normal" of the economy,it is necessary to complete the strategic goals such as supply-side structural reform,the transformation of old and new kinetic energy,and the transformation of economic development models to high-quality.At this time,as a resource ecological binding policy,whether environmental regulation can promote industrial structure upgrading is the key to development breakthrough.In addition,under the "yardstick competition" formed by the relative performance appraisal mechanism,the local government will refer to the behavior of the surrounding governments at the same level in the implementation of environmental regulation,so that the environmental governance behavior among local governments is no longer independent,but exists strategically interactive.Therefore,based on the perspective of strategic interaction among local governments,this paper explores the strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulation and its impact on industrial structure upgrading.Firstly,on the basis of sorting out the relevant theories and researches of environmental regulation,industrial structure upgrading and strategic interaction among local governments,this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of environmental regulation and the mechanism of its impact on industrial structure upgrading.Secondly,after investigating the development status and spatial correlation of environmental regulation and industrial structure upgrading in the sample period,with the help of the panel data of 30 inland provinces in China from 2004 to 2019,this paper constructs a spatial Durbin model to empirically test the strategic interaction of environmental regulation and its impact on industrial structure upgrading.Finally,the heterogeneity research is carried out from the two aspects of region and time series,and the environmental performance assessment indicators are further introduced based on the results of time series heterogeneity,so as to explore the moderating effect of the greening of official performance appraisal on the relationship between the strategic interaction of environmental regulation and industrial structure upgrading.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)There is a significant spatial agglomeration effect in the upgrading of industrial structure during the sample period,that is,positive spatial correlation.The improvement of the upgrading level of industrial structure in this region can promote the upgrading of industrial structure in surrounding areas,and vice versa.(2)The full-sample and sub-regional test results show that there is strategic interaction in the implementation of environmental regulation among China as a whole and eastern region local governments,and all of them are in the form of "race to the top",and environmental regulation has a positive role in promoting industrial structure upgrading in this region and surrounding areas;Under the sample of the central and western regions,the strategic interaction of environmental regulation among local governments is in the form of "race to the bottom",and environmental regulation has a negative inhibitory effect on industrial structure upgrading in this region and surrounding areas.(3)The results by time period show that during the period of 2004-2007,the strategic interaction of environmental regulation among local governments presents the form of " race to the bottom",and environmental regulation has a negative inhibitory effect on industrial structure upgrading in this region and surrounding areas;During the period from 2008 to 2012,according to the results of the advancement of industrial structure,the strategic interaction of environmental regulation among local governments presents the form of "differentiated competition".Environmental regulation can promote industrial structure upgrading in this region,but has a negative spatial spillover effect on industrial structure upgrading in the surrounding areas;The regression results for the 2013-2019 period are basically consistent with the full period.(4)With the greening of the official performance appraisal mechanism,under the full sample and the eastern sample,the environmental performance assessment indicators will not only strengthen the local promotion effect of environmental regulation on industrial structure upgrading,but also strengthen the positive spatial spillover effect under the strategic interaction of "race to the top".Under the sample of the central and western regions,the environmental performance assessment indicators will change the original "race to the bottom" strategy among local governments to a certain extent,and shift to a direction that is conducive to regional environmental governance and industrial structure upgrading.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,this paper puts forward reasonable and feasible policy suggestions from the aspects of strengthening macrocontrol,strengthening the centralization of environmental management,formulating differentiated environmental protection policies,and promoting the greening of political performance assessment.This paper has 16 figures,16 tables and 148 references.更多还原