节点文献
考虑不同公平关切的“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链决策
Decision Making of "Company+Farmer" Contract Farming Supply Chain Considering Different Fairness Concerns
【作者】 丁可可;
【导师】 冯颖;
【作者基本信息】 中国矿业大学 , 物流工程与管理(专业学位), 2022, 硕士
【摘要】 2020年新冠病毒(COVID-19)的爆发对社会各方面产生了巨大的影响,伴随着防疫政策的出台,我国的农产品产业链也受到了管控措施的严重限制,这是对国家粮食安全的一个全新挑战。订单农业作为农产品供应链中不可或缺的一环,在助农助产进程中起到关键作用,然而在疫情的大背景下,本就频发的违约现象愈演愈烈,公司与农户的参与积极性低,这无形中对订单农业的发展产生了巨大威胁。基于此现状,本文立足于“随行就市,保底收购”定价模式下的订单农业供应链,以不同的公平关切参照为切入点,探讨不同公平关切行为下“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的成员决策问题,旨在寻找合适的途径,提高订单农业成员的参与积极性。首先,在公平参照点为对方收益的情形下,分别构建公司与农户均公平中性,公司公平中性农户公平关切,公司公平关切农户公平中性,公司与农户均公平关切四种供应链结构模型,探讨不同公平关切行为对供应链的决策影响,并分析参数变化对决策变量和利润的影响。进一步,构建演化博弈模型,得到公司与农户的博弈均衡结果。经过数值仿真补充后,研究结果表明:在以对方收益为参照点时,公司和农户的公平关切显著影响供应链的均衡结果。农户的公平关切有利提高农产品农资投入量,迫使公司让利给农户。公司的公平关切则会蚕食农户的收益,导致农户农资投入量和收益降低,公司收益提高。公司与农户均公平关切时,公平关切同时影响双方的均衡结果。此外,农户与公司的演化稳定点为双方均采取公平关切。其次,在公平参照点为NASH谈判解的情形下,研究公司和农户不同公平关切行为对供应链的决策影响。进一步,构建演化博弈模型,获得农户与公司稳定博弈结果。最后,对比分析不同参照点下,同种公平关切行为的差异。经过算例仿真补充后,研究结果表明:在以NASH谈判解为参照点时,农户的公平关切满足一定条件时,公司才会让利给农户,公司的公平关切则会攫取更多农户的利润。公司与农户均公平关切时,公平关切同时影响双方的均衡结果。另外,在一定条件下,公司和农户的演化稳定策略为均采取公平关切。通过对不同参照点下的均衡结果进行比较后发现,以收益为参照点时的公司和农户的收益均高于以NASH谈判点为参照点时。最后,本文依据第三章和第四章的研究结果,针对订单农业供应链的成员在不同参照点下的不同公平关切行为,对农户、公司和政府推动订单农业供应链的稳定发展提出建议,对订单农业的发展起到推动作用。该论文有图38幅,表9个,参考文献66篇
【Abstract】 The outbreak of COVID-19(COVID-19)in 2020 has had a great impact on all aspects of society.With the introduction of the epidemic prevention policy,China’s agricultural product chain has also been severely restricted by the control measures,which is a new challenge to the national food security.As an indispensable part of the supply chain of agricultural products,contract farming plays a key role in the process of helping agriculture and midwifery.However,under the background of the epidemic,the phenomenon of frequent breach of contract is becoming more and more serious,which virtually poses a great threat to the development of contract agriculture.Based on this situation,this thesis is based on the order agricultural supply chain under the pricing mode of "Follow the Market,Buy at the Minimum" and takes different fairness concerns as the starting point to explore the decision-making of members of the"Company+Farmer" contract farming supply chain under different fairness concerns,in order to find appropriate ways to improve the participation enthusiasm of order agricultural members.Firstly,in the case that the fair reference point is the other party’s income,four supply chain structure models are constructed respectively:Company farmers’ equity neutral,company equity neutral,farmers’ equity concern,company equity concern,farmers’ equity neutral,and both companies and farmers’ equity concern.The impact of different equity related behaviors on supply chain decision-making is discussed,and the impact of parameter changes on decision variables and profits is analyzed.Further,an evolutionary game model is constructed to obtain the game equilibrium results between companies and farmers.After the supplement of numerical simulation,the research results show that when taking the other party’s income as the reference point,the equity concerns of companies and farmers significantly affect the equilibrium results of supply chain.Farmers’ appropriate equity concerns are conducive to increasing the input of agricultural products and agricultural materials,forcing companies to give profits to farmers.The equity concerns of the company will erode the income of farmers,resulting in the reduction of farmers’ agricultural inputs and income,and the increase of company income.When both companies and farmers are concerned about equity,equity concerns affect the balanced results of both sides at the same time.In addition,the evolutionary stability point of farmers and companies is that both sides adopt fair concerns.Secondly,when the fairness reference point is Nash negotiation solution,this thesis studies the impact of different fairness concerns of companies and farmers on supply chain decision-making.Further,an evolutionary game model is constructed to obtain the stable game results between farmers and companies.Finally,it compares and analyzes the differences of the same kind of fair concern behavior under different reference points.After the example simulation supplement,the research results show that when taking the Nash negotiation solution as the reference point,the company will give profits to farmers only when the farmers’ equity concerns meet certain conditions,and the company’s equity concerns will grab more farmers’ profits.When both companies and farmers are concerned about equity,equity concerns affect the balanced results of both sides at the same time.In addition,under certain conditions,the evolutionary stability strategy of companies and farmers is to take equity concerns.After comparing the equilibrium results under different reference points,it is found that the income of companies and farmers with income as the reference point is higher than that with Nash negotiation point.Finally,based on the research results of Chapter Ⅲ and Chapter Ⅳ,this thesis puts forward suggestions for farmers,companies and governments to promote the stable development of order agriculture supply chain,aiming at the different equity concerns of members of order agriculture supply chain under different reference points,hoping to promote the development of order agriculture.This thesis has 38 figures,9 tables and 66 references.
【Key words】 contract farming; reference point effect; fairness concerns; evolutionary game theory;
- 【网络出版投稿人】 中国矿业大学 【网络出版年期】2023年 02期
- 【分类号】F274;F323