【作者】 李雪；

【导师】 孙烨；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 企业管理， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 近些年,许多高级管理人员被曝出花费大量企业资金来进行自己的私人消费,他们可能会利用公务享受高消费娱乐活动和公款旅游,也可能会虚报差旅费和业务招待费。这些行为都可以归于为公司高管的超额在职消费。虽然有些在职消费是与企业的销售业绩直接相关的,但大部分超额在职消费都是公司管理层谋求个人的利益的途径,因此会侵害股东的利益,影响企业的价值。想要降低超额在职消费对企业的不利影响,在公司内部就应该建立健全有效的公司治理机制。监事会作为公司治理机制的重要组成部分,监事会的特征会影响监事会的监督效果和建议能力。监事会规模和监事会持股比例会对企业内部控制、信息披露质量和高管变更有显著影响。监事会的规模和监事会持股比例也会降低高管薪酬与公司业绩的相关性。有独立监事的监事会,不容易受到管理者的胁迫,有更强的监督能力。而具有专业技能的监事则更容易根据自己掌握的知识,为公司发展提出更加专业的建议。相较于同为大陆法系的日本和德国,中国的监事会制度发展比较晚,而且监事会的权力也比较低。2000年和2001年的会计丑闻震惊了世界。会计丑闻的出现表明,企业内部控制存在很大问题。内部控制应存在于公司运营的方方面面,关乎企业的可持续发展。具有高质量的内部控制的公司更容易保持竞争优势,积极应对各种风险。有学者认为监事会特征也会影响企业内部控制的有效性。本文选取2011年到2020年十年的数据,通过对数据的整理和分析,旨在探究监事会规模和监事会持股比例对超额在职消费的影响,以及企业内部控制是否存在调节作用。根据对数据的整理和分析,本文发现不同的产权性质和不同的行业类型,监事会规模、监事会持股比例和超额在职消费都显著不同。监事会规模和监事会持股比例对超额在职消费的影响显著为负。在非国有企业和非管制行业,监事会规模越大,对高管人员超额在职消费的抑制作用越小,更多地依靠持有监事会持股来抑制高管人员超额在职消费。同时,本文认为,有效的企业内部控制可以促进监事会有效遏制高管的超额在职消费的效果。当企业内部控制存在重大缺陷个数和重要缺陷个数越少时,有效遏制高管的超额在职消费的效果就越强。综上,本文认为有效的监事会能够降低超额在职消费水平。高质量的企业内部控制确实可以加强监事会对超额在职消费的抑制作用。最后,本文基于以上结论,从立法者和公司的角度,提出了降低超额在职消费水平的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,many senior executives have been exposed to spend a lot of corporate funds for their own private consumption.They may use the name of official business to enjoy highconsumption entertainment activities and public travel,or they may report more travel and business entertainment expenses.These behaviors can all be attributed to the excess perquisite consumption of executives.Although some of perquisite consumption is related to the corporate sales amount,most of the excess perquisite consumption is a way for executives to seek personal interests,which will damage the interests of shareholders and affect the value of the corporations.Board of supervisors is an important part of the corporate governance mechanism,and the characteristics of the board of supervisors will affect its ability to supervise and make recommendations.The size of the board of supervisors and the shareholding ratio of the board of supervisors have a significant impact on the executive compensation performance sensitivity,corporate internal control,information disclosure quality and executive changes.A board of supervisors with independent supervisors is less likely to be threaten by executives and has stronger supervisory capabilities.Supervisors with professional skills are more likely to make more professional suggestions for the development of the corporation based on their knowledge.Compared with Japan and Germany,both of which are civil law systems,China’s supervisory board system has developed relatively late,and the power of the supervisory board is relatively low.The accounting scandals of 2000 and 2001 shocked the world.The emergence of accounting scandals shows that there are great problems in the corporate internal control.Internal control should exist in all aspects of the corporate operations and is related to the sustainable development of the corporation.Corporations with high-quality internal controls are more likely to maintain a competitive advantage and actively respond to various risks.Some scholars believe that the characteristics of the board of supervisors will also affect the effectiveness of corporate internal control.This paper selects ten years of data from 2011 to 2020,and analyses data to explore the effect of the characteristics of the board of supervisors on executives’ excess perquisite consumption and whether there is a moderating effect on the corporate internal control.According to the analysis of the data,this paper finds that with different property rights and different industries,independent variables and dependent variable are significantly different.The characteristics of the board of supervisors have a significant negative impact on excess perquisite consumption.In non-state-owned corporations and non-regulated industries,the larger board of supervisors has little effect on the executives’ excess perquisite consumption.Corporations in non-regulated industries and non-state-owned corporations more relies on the board of supervisors to hold shares to restrain the executives’ excess perquisite consumption.At the same time,this paper finds that effective corporate internal control can promote the inhibitory effect of the board of supervisors on the executives’ excess perquisite consumption.When the number of major defects and the number of important defects in the corporate internal control is less,the supervisory board will have a stronger inhibitory effect on the executives’ excess perquisite consumption.To sum up,this paper argues that an effective supervisory board can reduce the level of excess perquisite consumption.High-quality corporate internal control can indeed strengthen the inhibitory effect of supervisory board on excess perquisite consumption.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward suggestions for reducing the level of excess perquisite consumption from the perspectives of legislators and corporations.更多还原