【作者】 胡卉；

【导师】 孙涛；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 金融（专业学位）， 2022， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来,中国国际地位的提高和文明的进步都得益于国家对创新和科研的不断重视。随着我国创新意识的不断崛起,国内自主研发能力不断提高。但即使在国家大力引导企业研发创新的基础上,研发资金不足依然是阻碍上市公司自主创新的重要难题。传统的债券融资渠道融资效率不高,不仅存在审批条件严格、贷款金额有限等问题,还会让企业背负巨大的利息支出。而股权质押作为一种兴起的股权融资方法,往往成为大股东解决企业短期资金周转问题的不错选择。本文旨在探究上市企业的控股股东通过股权质押筹集资金时,是否会在某种程度上对企业的研发创新造成负面影响,不同类型的上市公司研发投入所受到的影响是否相同,并且进一步探究企业面临的融资约束是否会在其中起到中介效应。同时针对理论和实证分析的结果,从企业、金融机构、政府等层面在对公司股权质押规范化管理以及股权质押的后续跟踪监督等方面提出建议。在具体研究上,本文对股权质押、研发创新和融资约束相关的国内外文献进行梳理与整合,并在现有文献的基础上结合控股股东代理理论、融资约束理论以及博弈论等经济学理论,提出本文的相应假设。最后,选取2010-2020年除金融行业以外的A股上市公司,固定样本的个体、年份、行业,探究大股东股权质押与企业创新的关系,同时用逐步回归法和Sobel检验法验证融资约束在其中发挥的中介效应。本文将理论和实证相结合,总结出以下结论:(1)控股股东的股权质押会对企业的研发投入规模产生抑制性作用。(2)在异质性分析中发现,从产权性质上看,民营企业股东如果进行股权质押,对该企业的研发创新的抑制作用会更显著;从股权集中度方面分析,企业的股权结构越集中,质押对企业研发的不利影响会越小。从行业分类上看,高新技术产业的控股股东的股权质押会加剧抑制企业的创新发展。(3)进一步进行机制分析发现,融资约束在两者之间发挥较为重要的部分中介效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,China’s rise in international standing and the progress of its civilization have all been attributed to the country’s continuous emphasis on innovation and scientific research.With the continuous rise of China’s innovation consciousness,the domestic independent research and development ability is constantly improving.Even on the basis of the state’s vigorous guidance of enterprise R&D and innovation,the lack of R&D funds is still an important problem hindering the independent innovation of listed companies.The financing efficiency of traditional bond financing channels is not high,which not only has problems such as strict approval conditions and limited loan amount,but also makes enterprises bear huge interest expenses.Therefore,as a rising equity financing method,equity pledge often becomes a good choice for major shareholders to solve the short-term capital turnover problem of enterprises.The purpose of this paper is to inquire when the controlling shareholders of listed companies to equity pledge to raise funds,will to some extent to the enterprise research and development innovation have a negative impact,the different types of research into the impact of listed companies are the same,and further explore the enterprise will face of financing constraints in intermediary effect.At the same time,according to the results of theoretical and empirical analysis,from the enterprise,financial institutions,the government and other levels of the company’s equity pledge standardization management and equity pledge follow-up tracking supervision and other aspects of the proposal.In terms of specific research,this paper sorts out and integrates domestic and foreign literatures related to equity pledge,R&D innovation and financing constraints,and puts forward corresponding hypotheses based on existing literatures and economic theories such as controlling shareholder agency theory,financing constraint theory and game theory.Finally,a-share listed companies excluding the financial industry from 2010 to 2020 are selected with fixed samples of individuals,years and industries to explore the relationship between equity pledge by major shareholders and enterprise innovation.At the same time,stepwise regression and Sobel test were used to verify the mediating effect of financing constraints.In this paper,theories and empirical evidence are combined,and the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Equity pledge by controlling shareholders will have an inhibiting effect on the scale of r&d investment of enterprises.(2)In the heterogeneity analysis,it is found that from the property right nature,if the shareholders of private enterprises pledge the equity,the inhibition effect on the R&D innovation of the enterprise is more significant;From the perspective of ownership concentration,the more concentrated the ownership structure is,the less the adverse impact of pledge on R&D will be.In terms of industry classification,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders in high-tech industries will aggravate and inhibit the innovation development of enterprises.(3)Further mechanism analysis shows that financing constraints play an important part of the mediation effect between the two.更多还原