【作者】 王帅；

【导师】 何焰；

【作者基本信息】 中南财经政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2021， 硕士

【摘要】 上市公司主动退市是指上市公司通过向证券交易所提出退出申请,将其证券退出证券市场交易的法律行为。由于上市公司中控股股东与中小股东存在着地位的不对等,控股股东利用优势地位侵害中小股东的行为时有发生。在主动退市中,中小股东亟需保护的权利集中在三个方面,即知情权、决策权和退出权。有基于此,本文有针对性地对上市公司主动退市下中小股东权益保护的完善进行研究。本文第一章对主动退市的含义与分类、上市公司主动退市的动因、以及上市公司主动退市下中小股东及其权利进行界定,并从主动退市可能会对中小股东权利所造成的损害加以分析,明晰本文所要研究的主题,为之后三章具体分析我国主动退市下中小股东权益保护的不足及其完善在概念上进行廓清。第二章主要围绕主动退市下中小股东的知情权保护来展开论述。我国在主动退市的信息披露方面还存在着披露时限模糊、披露范围较窄、缺乏专门的主动退市信息披露规则以及独立董事意见的独立性不足等问题。我国可以借鉴域外针对主动退市信息披露的立法经验,尤其是美国针对主动退市所制定的13e-3规则以及域外司法判例中对于信息披露的要求,通过扩大我国主动退市信息披露范围、明确信息披露时限要求以及增强独立董事意见的独立性等措施以实现对中小股东知情权更高程度的保护。第三章主要围绕主动退市下中小股东的决策权保护来展开。目前我国主动退市决策制度存在着法理基础缺失以及通过比例过低等问题,不利于实现主动退市下中小股东的决策权,应当通过对制度进行重新设计并提高通过比例以及增加反对票上限以实现对中小股东决策权更全面的保护。第四章主要围绕主动退市下中小股东的退出权保护来展开。若中小股东对主动退市决议持有不同意见,可以通过行使退出权的方式来实现“用脚投票”。但是目前我国在退出权方面仅为原则性规定,也缺乏回购价格的议价机制,这使得中小股东在行使退出权时存在路径不畅和补偿不足的问题。我国应当借鉴域外对于中小股东退出权保障的经验,从明确退出权的适用范围和行权程序来解决中小股东退出权行使不畅的问题,从引入回购价格计算方法和议价机制等方面来解决中小股东补偿不足的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 The voluntary delisting of a listed company refers to the legal act of a listed company withdrawing its securities from trading in the securities market by filing an exit application with the stock exchange for business needs or other interests.Because of the natural non-equal status between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders in the listed company,the behavior of the controlling shareholders to infringe on the small and the minority shareholders by using the dominant position occurs from time to time.In a voluntary delisting,the rights that small and the minority shareholders urgently need to protect are concentrated in three aspects,namely,the right to know,the right to make decisions and the right to withdraw.Based on this,this paper aims at the deficiency of the protection of small and the minority shareholders under the voluntary delisting of China,and studies the perfection of the protection of the rights and interests of small and the minority shareholders under the voluntary delisting by drawing on the foreign experience.The first chapter of this paper focuses on the meaning and classification of voluntary delisting,the reasons for voluntary delisting companies,and the minority shareholders and their rights under voluntary delisting of listed companies,and analyzes the damage caused by the rights of the minority shareholders from voluntary delisting,clarifies the subject to be studied in this paper,and specifically analyzes the shortcomings of the protection of the rights and interests of the minority shareholders under voluntary delisting in China in the next three chapters and perfects them in the concept.The second chapter mainly focuses on the protection of the right to know of the minority shareholders under the voluntary delisting.In China,there are still some problems in the disclosure time limit,narrow disclosure scope,lack of special active de-listed information disclosure rules and the lack of independence of independent directors’ opinions.China can learn from the legislative experience of extraterrient information disclosure,especially the 13e-3 rules formulated by the United States for active de-listing and the requirements for information disclosure in extraterrient judicial jurisprudence,to achieve a higher degree of protection of the right of small and medium-sized shareholders to know by expanding the scope of information disclosure of active de-marketing in China,clarifying the time limit requirements for information disclosure,and enhancing the independence of independent directors’ opinions.The third chapter mainly focuses on the protection of approval of delisting of the minority shareholders under voluntary delisting.At present,There are some problems such as the lack of legal basis and the low adoption ratio in voluntary delisting decision-making system of China,it is not conducive to the realization of the decision-making power of small and medium-sized shareholders under active de-marketing,which should realize the all-round protection of the approval of delisting of the minority shareholders by redesigning the system and increasing the adoption ratio and increasing the upper limit of the opposition vote.The fourth chapter mainly focuses on the protection of the right of exit of the minority shareholders under voluntary delisting.If the minority shareholders have different views on the resolution of voluntary delisting,they can realize "voting with their feet" by exercising the right to withdraw.However,at present,China’s dissenting shareholder repurchase right and cash option are only principled provisions,but also lack of repurchase price bargaining mechanism,which makes the minority shareholders in the exercise of the right to withdraw there is a poor path and insufficient compensation.China should learn from the experience of protection of the right of withdrawal of the minority shareholders in foreign capital markets,solve the problem of the poor exercise of the right of withdrawal of the minority shareholders from the clear scope of application and exercise procedures,and solve the problem of insufficient compensation of the minority shareholders from the introduction of repurchase price calculation method and bargaining mechanism.更多还原